The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
None
PR
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
High
I
There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the attacker being able to modify any file on the target system.
Availability
High
A
There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can deny access to the system or data, potentially causing significant loss to the organization.
Below is a copy: National Instruments Linux Driver Remote Code Injection
Hello folks,
i've recently discovered a critical vulnerability in the National
Instruments Linux driver package, which opens up an remote code
injection (software update) vulnerability.
Classification:
CRITICAL / 0day - easily exploitable
Impact:
Complete takeover of the OS itself
Takeover of (potentially critical) industrial machinery
Affected product(s):
NI Linux Device Drivers / July 2018
http://www.ni.com/download/ni-linux-device-drivers-2018/7664/en/
Affected platforms(s):
GNU/Linux - RHEL, SLES (other distros aren't supported anyways)
Vulnerability:
The product adds additional package repositories to the OS'es package
manager, but disables signature checks and uses plain (unencrypted)
HTTP for software downloads.
Further details can be easily seen in the deployed package repository
configuration file (ni-software-2018.repo).
Attack vectors:
The victim can be tricked to download/install manipulated updates, eg.
via MITM, dns spoofing, etc - so the attacker can abuse software
updates for direct malware deployment and also take over the whole
operating system (eg. kernel) itself.
Mitigation:
#1: remove the package 'ni-software-2018'
#2: make sure, the repo description files are removed:
SLES:
/etc/zypp/repos.d/ni-software-2018.repo
/etc/zypp/vendors.d/ni.conf
RHEL:
/etc/yum/repos.d/ni-software-2018.repo
#3: refresh the package manager index
This removes the NI repository from the OS'es package manager - the NI
software now can't be automatically installed/updated via package
manager anymore.
In case the operator still trusts the vendor enough to deploy it's
software, this now has to be done manually (note: the packages can
only be downloaded via insecure plain HTTP !). It's strongly adviced
not to install any software from untrusted sources / via untrusted
channels.
If an system update (even a minor patch) via package manager was done
in the meantime, it's *highly* adviced to carefully check all
installed packages against the original repositories - the system
easily could be compromised by now !
Solution:
The vendor (NI) needs to setup proper package signing infrastructure,
add it's public key to the repo configuration and enable gpgcheck.
Final notes:
Since NI is one of few vendors with special certifications, eg. ATEX,
railway, etc, it's likely this hardware can be found in very critical
infrastructure (eg. power plants, factories, etc) and those
potentially could already be compromised by now via driver update.
About the author:
GNU/Linux veteran with strong background in software engineering,
embedded systems, industrial automation, IT infrastructure.
email: [email protected]
phone: +49-151-27565287
--
Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult
Free software and Linux embedded engineering
[email protected] -- +49-151-27565287
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