The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
None
PR
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
High
I
There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the attacker being able to modify any file on the target system.
Availability
High
A
There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can deny access to the system or data, potentially causing significant loss to the organization.
Below is a copy: Avaya one-X 9.x / 10.0.x / 10.1.x Arbitrary File Disclosure / Deletion
===============================
- Advisory -
===============================
Tittle: one-X portal arbitrary OS file access
Risk: High
Date: 07.Ago.2018
Author: Pedro Andujar
Twitter: @pandujar
.: [ INTRO ] :
one-X Portal for IP Office is an application that runs on a web server connected to the IP Office telephone system. Using a web browser, one can access
the one-X Portal for IP Office and use it to perform actions such as:
* Control your telephone calls.
* View details of calls and directories of contacts.
* Configure settings that affect how your calls are treated by the telephone system.
* Conference calls.
* Manage your voicemail messages.
.: [ TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION ] :.
Avaya one-x for ip office contains a default low privileged account, which has limited access to the application, where it's intended to perform backup duties.
An arbitrary file download issue was found in the backup portal, affecting to either Linux and Windows versions of the 9.x, 10.0.x and 10.1.x series. An
authenticated remote attacker could send specially crafted request leading into potential information disclosure and DoS.
.: [ ISSUE #1 ]:.
Name: Arbitrary OS file download/deletion
Severity: High
CVE: CVE-2018-15610
DownloadToLocalDriveServlet allows to download any operating system file.
<<<REQUEST>>>
GET /path/to/DownloadToLocalDriveServlet**REDACTED** HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.38
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:58.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/58.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://192.168.1.38/onexportal-afa.html
Cookie: JSESSIONID=740B74DC4B77E0B8EB8F4FED6BA5EAE8;
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
<<<RESPONSE>>>
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=passwd;
Content-Type: application/zip
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 20:38:39 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 1910
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
....
This request also deletes de file after being downloaded (depending on the OS file and process permissions). Be carefull on Windows version as process runs with
system privileges.
Vulnerable piece of code:
if (sessionManager.isSessionAlive(session)) {
String folder = req.getParameter("folder");
String filename = req.getParameter("filename");
if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) logger.debug(new Object[] { "doGet(), folder:", Helper.reformatFolderPath(folder), ", filename: ", filename });
BufferedOutputStream bos = null;
FileInputStream in = null;
try {
resp.setContentType("application/zip");
resp.setHeader("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=" + filename + ";");
bos = new BufferedOutputStream(resp.getOutputStream());
in = new FileInputStream(Helper.reformatFolderPath(folder) + filename)
.: [ CHANGELOG ] :.
* 18/Mar/2018: - Vuln discovered during pentest engagement.
* 19/Mar/2018: - Avaya product security contacted.
* 19/Mar/2018: - Avaya product security replied.
* 23/Mar/2018: - Avaya product security confirmed and planned fix.
* 23/Jul/2018: - Fix available to customers.
* 31/Ago/2018: - Public disclosure.
(Kudos to the ProducSec Team, for the excelent communication and incident handling)
.: [ SOLUTIONS ] :.
- DownloadToLocalDriveServlet it is only intended to download backup zip files from server to the desktop. Backup file default folder it's predefined setting that
appears as serverFolderForBackup directive on $TOMCAT\bin\inyama-user.xml file, and therefore do not need to be passed through GET parameter.
String serverFolder = loggedInUser.getServerFolder() + File.separator;
File downloadedFile = new File(Helper.reformatFolderPath(serverFolder), fileName);
- Implement file type checks and enforce/append .zip extension (this is also recomended for UploadFromLocalServlet.class which allows arbitrary file upload,
but at least enforces destination folder).
- Avoid sending filename as GET or ensure path traversal protection is in place.
https://downloads.avaya.com/css/P8/documents/101051984
For 10.0.x, upgrade to IP Office one-X portal 10.0.702.16.
For 10.1.x, upgrade to IP Office one-X portal 10.1.300.12.
Fix is also provided in 11.0 or later.
Avaya strongly recommends following networking and security best practices by implementing firewalls, ACLs, physical security or other appropriate access
restrictions. Though Avaya believes such restrictions should always be in place, risk to Avaya products and the surrounding network from this potential
vulnerability may be mitigated by ensuring these practices are implemented until such time as an Avaya provided product update or the recommended Avaya
action is applied. Further restrictions as deemed necessary based on the customer's security policies may be required during this interim period, but the
System Product operating system or application should not be modified unless the change is approved by Avaya. Making changes that are not approved may void
the Avaya product service contract.
.: [ REFERENCES ] :.
[+] Installing Avaya one-XA(r) Portal for IP OfficeaC/ Platform
https://downloads.avaya.com/css/P8/documents/101028405
[+] Avaya Product Security
https://support.avaya.com/security
[+] Cobalt.io
https://app.cobalt.io/researchers
-=EOF=-
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