The vulnerable system is bound to a protocol stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared proximity (e.g., Bluetooth, NFC, or IEEE 802.11) or logical network (e.g., local IP subnet), or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN within an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
None
PR
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
Scope
S
An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority that is managing the vulnerable component. This is often referred to as a 'privilege escalation,' where the attacker can use the exploited vulnerability to gain control of resources that were not intended or authorized.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
High
I
There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the attacker being able to modify any file on the target system.
Availability
High
A
There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can deny access to the system or data, potentially causing significant loss to the organization.
Below is a copy: Check Point Identity Agent Arbitrary File Write
### Advisory: Privileged File Write
Description
===========
The Check Point Identity Agent allows low privileged users to write files to protected locations of the file system.
Details
=======
Advisory ID: usd-2021-0005
Product: Check Point Identity Agent
Affected Version: < R81.018.0000
Vulnerability Type: Symlink Vulnerability
Security Risk: High
Vendor URL: https://www.checkpoint.com
Vendor Status: Fixed
Advisory URL: https://herolab.usd.de/security-advisories/usd-2021-0005/
First Published: 2021-03-31
Introduction
============
The Check Point Identity Agent allows low privileged users to write files to protected locations of the file system.
Privileged file write vulnerabilities allow low privileged users to create or overwrite files in arbitrary locations of the file system.
The impact of these attacks largely depends on the content that is written to the files. If the content is user controlled, privilege escalations are usually possible. Otherwise, the vulnerability can be used to perform Denial of Service attacks.
Proof of Concept
================
The Check Point Identity Agent allows users to collect information for the technical support. This information is collected to a Windows Cabinet file and stored within a user defined location. During the write operation that creates the Cabinet file, the service uses the permissions of the SYSTEM account, which allows low privileged users to create the Cabinet file in arbitrary locations of the file system. By using a symbolic link, the file name is also fully user controlled and the write operation can also be redirected to already existing files.
In the following screenshot, a low privileged user account sets the log folder of the Check Point Identity Agent to a user controlled path on the file system. This is possible within the tray menu of the agent.
Screenshot URL: https://herolab.usd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/01-set-log-folder.png
The Cabinet file that we will create soon has a naming scheme of CP_Identity_Agent_Logs_25-01-2021_17.07.11.cab. As the name contains the current time and the export takes a while, an reliable attack requires multiple symbolic links. For our demonstration, we use the following simple script to create these:
```
C:\Users\tony\Desktop> type link.bat
C:\ProgramData\CreateSymlink.exe -p C:\Linker\CP_Identity_Agent_Logs_31-01-2021_12.13.00.cab C:\Windows\win.ini
C:\ProgramData\CreateSymlink.exe -p C:\Linker\CP_Identity_Agent_Logs_31-01-2021_12.13.01.cab C:\Windows\win.ini
C:\ProgramData\CreateSymlink.exe -p C:\Linker\CP_Identity_Agent_Logs_31-01-2021_12.13.02.cab C:\Windows\win.ini
C:\ProgramData\CreateSymlink.exe -p C:\Linker\CP_Identity_Agent_Logs_31-01-2021_12.13.03.cab C:\Windows\win.ini
C:\ProgramData\CreateSymlink.exe -p C:\Linker\CP_Identity_Agent_Logs_31-01-2021_12.13.04.cab C:\Windows\win.ini
[...]
```
Within the script, we make obviously use of the symboliclink-testing-tools (https://github.com/googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools) by James Forshaw (https://twitter.com/tiraniddo). After invoking the script, all possible file system locations for the to be generated Cabinet file point now to C:\Windows\win.ini, which is not writable for low privileged user accounts. Now we can request technical support information within the agents tray menu:
Screenshot URL: https://herolab.usd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/02-request-technical-support-info.png
When the export finished, the C:\Windows\win.ini file should be overwritten with the contents of the Cabinet file. The following listing shows the original and the new content of the file:
```
C:\> type Windows\win.ini
; for 16-bit app support
[fonts]
[extensions]
[mci extensions]
[files]
[Mail]
MAPI=1
C:\> type C:\Windows\win.ini
MSCF [...]
```
Fix
=======
Whenever high privileged services write data into user controlled parts of the file system, they should make sure to impersonate the corresponding user during the operation. Additionally, protection mechanisms can be implemented to avoid following symlinks during write operations.
Timeline
=========
2021-02-12 Vulnerability discovered by Tobias Neitzel
2021-02-13 Initial contact with vendor
2021-03-02 Vendor provides patch for retest
2021-03-18 Patch published by vendor in release R81.018.0000
2021-03-31 Security Advisory released
Credits
================
This security vulnerability was discovered by Tobias Neitzel (https://twitter.com/qtc_de) of usd AG (https://www.usd.de/).
Disclaimer
==========
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible.
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