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Google Chrome Installer DLL Hijack vulnerability

CVE Category Price Severity
CVE-2019-10090 CWE-426 $10,000 High
Author Risk Exploitation Type Date
Unknown High Local 2018-01-03
CPE
cpe:cpe:/a:google:chrome
CVSS EPSS EPSSP
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H 0.02192 0.50148

CVSS vector description

Our sensors found this exploit at: https://cxsecurity.com/ascii/WLB-2018010008

Below is a copy:

Google Chrome Installer DLL Hijack vulnerability
                    
Affected Product: Google Chrome Installer Client 1.3.33.7 for Windows PC
Credit: Rohit Bankoti and Souhardya Sardar
Contact : [email protected]

*Summary:*
Google Chrome installer contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that could allow an
unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the targeted
system and gain elevated privileges. The vulnerability exists due to some
DLL file is loaded by 'ChromeSetup.exe' improperly. And it allows an
attacker to load this DLL file of the attacker as choosing that could
execute arbitrary code without the user's knowledge.



*Tested on*: Windows 7

*Impact:*
Attacker can exploit this vulnerability to load a DLL file of the
attacker's choosing that could execute arbitrary code. This may help
attacker to successfully exploit the system if user creates shell as a DLL.



If an attacker places malicious DLL in the user's "Downloads" directory
this vulnerability becomes a arbitrary code execution.

*Proof of concept/demonstration*:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. Create a malicious 'dwmapi.dll' file and save it in your "Downloads"
directory.

2. Download 'ChromeSetup.exe' and save it in your "Downloads" directory.

3. Execute ChromeSetup.exe from your "Downloads" directory.

4. Malicious dll file gets executed.


Almost all executable installers (and self-extractors as well
as "portable" applications too) for Windows have a well-known
(trivial, trivial to detect and trivial to exploit) vulnerability:
they load system DLLs from their "application directory" (or a
temporary directory they extract their payload to) instead of
"%SystemRoot%\System32\".


| To ensure secure loading of libraries
| * Use proper DLL search order.
| * Always specify the fully qualified path when the library location
    ~~~~~~
|   is constant.
| * Load as data file when required.
| * Make use of code signing infrastructure or AppLocker.

Request a CVE ?! 

Regards ~ NightHunter



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