The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
High
PR
The attacker requires privileges that provide significant (e.g., administrative) control over the vulnerable system allowing full access to the vulnerable system’s settings and files.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
High
I
There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the attacker being able to modify any file on the target system.
Availability
High
A
There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can deny access to the system or data, potentially causing significant loss to the organization.
Below is a copy: Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 Keystroke Injection
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Advisory ID: SYSS-2019-011
Product: Wireless Keyboard Set LX390
Manufacturer: Fujitsu
Affected Version(s): Model No. GK381
Tested Version(s): Model No. GK381
Vulnerability Type: Cryptographic Issues (CWE-310)
Keystroke Injection Vulnerability
Risk Level: High
Solution Status: Open (product reached end-of-life (EOL) in May 2019)
Manufacturer Notification: 2019-04-01
Solution Date: -
Public Disclosure: 2019-10-23
CVE Reference: CVE-2019-18200
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg (SySS GmbH)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Overview:
Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 is a wireless desktop set consisting
of a mouse and a keyboard.
The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1, 2]):
"The Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 is an excellent desktop solution for
users with ambition. This durable keyboard set is equipped with secure
2.4 GHz technology and plug and play technology. The elegant mouse works
on most surfaces due to its precise 1000 dpi sensor. It offers fabulous
features and ultra slim, portable design."
Due to an insecure implementation of the data communication, the
wireless keyboard LX390 is prone to keystroke injection attacks.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vulnerability Details:
SySS GmbH found out that the wireless desktop set Fujitsu LX390 is
vulnerable to keystroke injection attacks, as the used data
communication is unencrypted, which is described in the SySS security
advisory SYSS-2019-010 (see [3]), and unauthenticated.
By analyzing the used radio communication protocol, the so-called data
whitening or data scrambling mechanism used by the 2.4 GHz radio
transceiver, and its configuration, an attacker is able to send
arbitrary keystrokes to a victim's computer system. In this way, an
attacker can remotely take control over the victim's computer that is
operated with an affected Fujitsu LX390 wireless desktop set.
The actual configuration for a specific targeted keyboard regarding the
used data whitening configuration can be learned by remotely analyzing
the radio communication.
In combination with the replay attack described in the SySS security
advisory SYSS-2019-009 (see [4]), a keystroke injection attack allows to
remotely attack computer systems with an active screen lock, for example
in order to install malware when the target system is unattended.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Proof of Concept (PoC):
SySS GmbH could successfully perform keystroke injection attacks against
the Fujitsu wireless desktop set LX390 using a software-defined radio
in combination with an in-house developed software tool utilizing GNU
Radio [5].
For the protocol analysis and initial proof-of-concept attacks,
Universal Radio Hacker (URH) [6] was used.
SySS GmbH could also perform successful keystroke injection attacks
using another in-house developed software tool in combination with the
USB radio dongle Crazyradio PA and the nrf-research-firmware by Bastille
Networks Internet Security written by Marc Newlin (see [7] and [8]).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Solution:
The Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 reached its end-of-life (EOL) in
May 2019.
Fujitsu has released two new wireless keyboard sets named LX410 [9] and
LX960 [10] that are not affected by the described security issue.
SySS recommends replacing LX390 wireless keyboard sets used in
environments with higher security demands, for instance with one of the
newer successor models LX410 or LX960.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclosure Timeline:
2019-04-01: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2019-04-02: Fujitsu confirms receipt of security advisory and asks
questions regarding the reported security issue;
answered open questions
2019-04-11: Received further questions from manufacturer
2019-04-18: Answered open questions and postponed disclosure date
2019-10-08: Reminded manufacturer of the upcoming release of the
security advisory
2019-10-18: Discussed details of coordinated disclosure with
manufacturer
2019-10-21: Public release of security advisory
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
References:
[1] Product website for Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 (not available anymore)
https://www.fujitsu.com/global/products/computing/peripheral/accessories/input-devices/keyboards/keyboard-lx390.html
[2] Data sheet Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390
https://produktinfo.conrad.com/datenblaetter/1300000-1399999/001375431-da-01-en-FUJITSU_DESKTOP_SET_WIREL_LX390_WEISS.pdf
[3] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2019-010
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2019-010.txt
[4] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2019-009
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2019-009.txt
[5] GNU Radio
https://www.gnuradio.org/
[6] Universal Radio Hacker (URH)
https://github.com/jopohl/urh
[7] Product website for Crazyradio PA
https://www.bitcraze.io/crazyradio-pa/
[8] Bastille's nRF24 research firmware and tools
https://github.com/BastilleResearch/nrf-research-firmware
[9] Product website for Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX410
https://www.fujitsu.com/global/products/computing/peripheral/accessories/input-devices/keyboards/keyboard-lx410.html
[10] Product website for Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX960
https://www.fujitsu.com/global/products/computing/peripheral/accessories/input-devices/keyboards/keyboard-lx960.html
[11] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2019-011
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2019-011.txt
[12] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH.
E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web
site.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
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